DIVIDED WE FALL: PAROLE SUPERVISION CONDITIONS PROHIBITING
“INTER-OFFENDER” ASSOCIATIONS
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In the United States, almost all criminal offenders who serve a term of imprisonment are
subject to a period of post-incarceration supervision. Commonly known as parole, this form of
supervision requires former inmates to comply with a variety of conditions. A nationwide survey
of standard parole conditions reveals that a vast majority of jurisdictions categorically restrict
parolees’ associations with other parolees, convicted criminals, and/or convicted felons. These
blanket offender no-association conditions ostensibly presume that former offenders are
irreparably flawed, homogenous, and that “inter-offender relationships”* are uniformly
criminogenic. This article questions those presumptions, suggesting that offender no-association
conditions endorse an untenable conceptualization of former offenders, a rejection of evidencebased parole practices, an uninformed view of inter-offender associations, and a superficial
application of criminological theory. This article further argues that by categorically prohibiting
all inter-offender associations, offender no-association conditions foreclose strengths-based
approaches to reentry and inhibit mechanisms that can foster criminal desistance. In this way,
such conditions unnecessarily subvert the rehabilitative goal of parole, likely making them
impermissibly overbroad in their current form.
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INTRODUCTION

America’s jails and prisons currently hold over 2.2 million citizens,1 and each year,
roughly 500,000 of these citizens return to their communities under some form of supervision.2
More than 840,000 former inmates now live supervised,3 a total that has climbed by 100,000 in
the past decade.4
Though names for post-incarceration supervision vary considerably, most jurisdictions
use “parole” to describe a term of supervision that follows a period of confinement.5 A form of
1
See LAUREN E. GLAZE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, NCJ 236319 at 3, Table 1:
Estimated number of persons supervised by adult correctional systems, by correctional status, 2000 and 2005–2010 (Dec.
2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus10.pdf (estimating the number of persons incarcerated in the United
States as 2,266,800 – 1,518,104 (prisons) and 748,728 (jails)).
2

See LAUREN E. GLAZE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES 2010, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, NCJ 236019 at 7,
Figure 6: National estimates of parole entries and exits, and annual change in the parole population, 2000–2010 (Nov.
2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus10.pdf (indicating that in 2000, just over 450,000 former inmates entered
the United States parole system, while in 2010, 565,300 people entered the United States parole system).
3

Id. at 1 (reporting the year-end 2010 parolee population as 840,676 parolees).

4

GLAZE & BONCZAR, supra note 2, at 16, Table 12: Estimated number of persons supervised by adult
correctional systems, by correctional status, 2000 and 2005–2010 (showing that the number of parolees in the United
States has grown by 115,149 parolees between 2000 (725,527) and 2010 (840,676)); see also PAUL GUERINO, PAIGE M.
HARRISON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2010, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, NCJ 236096 at 6, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf (“Most offenders are
released in one of two ways. About three-quarters are released conditionally (i.e., released to parole or another form of
supervised release. About a quarter are released unconditionally (e.g. expiration of sentence or commutation)”).
5

Throughout this Article, I use the term “parole” to refer to all forms of supervision that follow a period of
imposed confinement. Traditionally, parole followed an inmate’s discretionary release from prison and was the only form
of post-release supervision. See LOUIS P. CARNEY, PROBATION AND PAROLE: LEGAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 155 (1977)
(defining parole as “a correctional device through which an offender, after serving less than his or her total sentence, is
conditionally released from a penal facility, under active supervision, with social reintegration as the objective”); see also
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1227 (Bryan A. Garner, ed., 9th ed. 2009) (“Parole: The conditional release of a prisoner from
imprisonment before the full sentence has been served.”). Yet, with the advent of sentencing guidelines, mandatory
minimum sentences, and truth-in-sentencing laws, a number of jurisdictions began to employ an alternative form of postrelease supervision. See NEIL P. COHEN, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 1-4 (2nd ed. 1999) (“Another variety of
release, resembling parole in many ways, has been adopted in some jurisdictions.”). Unlike traditional conceptualizations
of parole, this alternative form of supervision follows a definite period of confinement and is usually part of a determinate
sentence. See EDWARD E. RHINE, WILLIAM R. SMITH & RONALD W. JACKSON, PAROLING AUTHORITIES: RECENT
HISTORY AND CURRENT PRACTICE 24-26, 61-67 (1991) (discussing the national trend away from indeterminate sentences
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qualified liberty, parole demands that former inmates abide by a host of conditions established by
paroling authorities or courts.6 Failure to comply with these conditions can result in reimprisonment.7
Twenty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government impose a
standard parole condition that prohibits supervisees from associating with other offenders.8 Parole
authorities and courts allege that “offender no-association conditions”9 foster reintegration by
preemptively eradicating criminogenic relationships.10 In this way, such measures purportedly
serve the twin goals of parole: protecting the public and promoting rehabilitation.11

and towards determinate sentences which mandate that an offender serve a fixed period of incarceration followed by a
term of post-release supervision). Nevertheless, this type of supervision is similar to traditional conceptualizations of
parole in virtually every other aspect; most notably, this form of supervision follows a period of incarceration.
Accordingly, many jurisdictions use the term “parole” to reference this new form of post-release supervision. Yet, in other
jurisdictions, this form of supervision takes on a host of names including post-release supervision (e.g. Kansas). Other
names for post-release supervision include, but are not limited to: probation (e.g. Maine); post-extended supervision (e.g.
Wisconsin); conditional release (e.g. Florida); post-prison supervision (e.g. Oregon); supervised release (e.g. Federal
System); and other assorted names (e.g. Florida). See NEIL P. COHEN, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 1-4 (2nd ed.
1999).
6

See Lawrence Travis III & James Stacey, A Half Century of Parole Rules: Conditions of Parole in the
United States, 2008, 38 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 604 (2010); see also COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.1, at 1-4, 1-5.
7

Travis and Stacey, supra note 6, at 604; COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.1, at 1-4, 1-5.

8

See infra Figure 1; infra Appendix (providing a jurisdictional breakdown of standard parole conditions
that limit supervisees contact with other offenders).
9
Throughout this Article, I use the term “offender no-association condition” to describe a parole condition
that prohibits supervisees from associating with other parolees, convicted criminals, and/or convicted felons. See David N.
Adair, Looking at the Law: Enforcing the “Association” Condition, 59 DEC. FED. PROB. 76 (1995) (defining association
conditions as “prohibit[ing] an offender from associating with certain other persons or classes of persons”); see infra Part
II (describing the types of association restrictions at work in the United States); see also Sarah Turnbull & Kelly HannahMoffat, Under These Conditions, 49 BRIT. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 532, 541 (2009) (examining the impact of parole
conditions on female offenders in Canada and describing Canada’s association conditions as “require[ing] parolees to
‘refrain from meeting or communicating with any person whom [they] know to have a criminal record or for whom [they]
have reason to believe that he/she has a criminal record,’ which may include friends, intimate partners and ‘criminally
involved’ family members.”).
10

See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 5, § 9.5, at 9-9 (“Irrespective of one’s views on the etiology of crime,
virtually everyone would agree that some criminal activity may be fostered by an offender’s particular social milieu”); see
also United States v. Albanese, 554 F.2d 543, 546 (1977) (discussing the rationale for offender no-association conditions
in the probation context) (“Because permitting a probationer ‘association with hardened or veteran criminals’ would defeat
probation’s underlying purpose (rehabilitation), it has for many years been one of the standard conditions of probation that
such association is prohibited”) (citing United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 357 (1928)) (parenthetical added).
11
See Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 282, 307 (1971) (noting that parole “serve[s] two
distinct purposes: facilitation of the rehabilitation and reintegration into society of the parolee, and protection of society”);
see also JEREMY TRAVIS & CHRISTY VISHER, PRISONER REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA 7 (2005) (describing the “twin
goals” of parole as “recidivism reduction” and “safety enhancement”). But see COHEN, supra note 5, § 7.3, fn. 1, at 7-6
(noting that fostering rehabilitation and protecting the public are very similar, but pointing out that these goals differ as
“[t]he rehabilitative goal can be construed as preventing future violations of criminal law; the law-abiding standard
arguably refers to the more inclusive goal of stopping potential violations of either criminal or civil laws” and “it is
arguable that rehabilitation goes far beyond requiring law-abiding conduct, embracing purely moral matters”).
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The Supreme Court has held that reintegration is the primary purpose of parole.12 In turn,
lower courts have reasoned that parole conditions promote reintegration if they protect the public
and facilitate rehabilitation.13 Deducing that criminal behavior frustrates these twin goals of
parole,14 courts generally uphold restrictions reasonably related to preventing a supervisee from
engaging in criminal activities.15 When parole conditions implicate fundamental liberties, courts
typically require that jurisdictions narrowly tailor such conditions.16 To date, courts have almost
unanimously upheld offender conditions.17
Yet, the effectiveness of offender no-association conditions is speculative; they have
never undergone empirical analysis.18 Moreover, the theoretical underpinnings of offender noassociation conditions are tenuous. Categorically prohibiting contact with anyone who has,
perhaps only once, deviated from recognized law, offender no-association conditions presume that
offenders are perpetually prone to criminality, that parolees’ needs are universal, and that inter-

12

See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972) (noting the primary aim of parole “is to help
individuals reintegrate into society as constructive individuals as soon as they are able”); see also Greenholtz v. Inmates of
Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (“It is important that we not overlook the ultimate purpose of
parole which is a component of the long-range objective of rehabilitation.”).
13

See Best v. Nurse, No. 99-3727, 1999 WL 1243055, *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1999) (“Two interests that
have been found legitimate are rehabilitating parolees and ensuring the protection of the public.”). These are also the
professed goals of probation. See, e.g., Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 333 (1971) (“The object, of course, is to produce a
law abiding citizen and at the same time to protect the public against continued criminal or antisocial behavior.”).
14

See, e.g., Malone v. U.S., 502 F.2d 554, 556-57 (9th Cir. 1974) (“There is reasonable nexus between the
probation conditions and the goals of probation. A convicted criminal may be reasonably restricted as part of his sentence
with respect to his associations in order to prevent his future criminality.”) (probation context); Birzon v. King, 469 F.2d
1241, 1243 (2d Cir. 1972) (“[W]hen a convict is conditionally released on parole, the Government retains a substantial
interest in insuring that its rehabilitative goal is not frustrated and that the public is protected from further criminal acts by
the parolee.” (citing Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1963)) (parole context).
15
See United States v. Napulou, 593 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2010) (“When we have upheld such
restrictions, the barred activity bore a reasonable relationship to the risk that the defendant would return to his criminal
behavior.”) (probation context); see also State v. Allen, 634 S.E.2d 653, 659 (S.C. 2006) (discussing a condition that
forbid a parolee from associating with persons with a criminal record and stating, “[t]he condition is reasonably related to
the crime for which Appellant was convicted, is intended to prevent future criminal conduct, and should aid in Appellant’s
rehabilitation”) (parole context).
16
See Bostic v. Jackson, No. 9:04-CV-676 (NAM/GJD), 2008 WL 1882696, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24,
2008) (“Restrictions upon the First Amendment rights of parolees are valid as long as ‘the restrictions are reasonably and
necessarily related to the advancement of some justifiable purpose of [parole].’” (quoting Birzon, 469 F.2d at 1243 (cited
in Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 497 (2d Cir. 2006)))); see also United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 128 (3d Cir.
1999) (“[T]he restrictions on . . . First Amendment freedoms are permissible because the . . . condition is narrowly tailored
and is directly related to deterring [the Appellant] and protecting the public.”) (federal probation); United States v.
Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975) (“Conditions that unquestionably restrict otherwise inviolable
constitutional rights may properly be subject to special scrutiny to determine whether the limitation does in fact serve the
dual objectives of rehabilitation and public safety.”) (federal probation); Best, 1999 WL 1243055, at *3 (“[R]estrictions on
the First Amendment rights of parolees are permitted in limited circumstances, when the restrictions serve to further a
legitimate interest of the parole regime.”).
17

See infra Part II.

18

See COHEN, supra note 5, at 9-34 (“An evaluation of no-association probation and parole conditions is
difficult. Although it is possible that some offenders will profit from them, it is also likely that others will not.”).
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offender relationships are uniformly, or at least consistently, criminogenic.19 These presumptions
reflect an untenable conceptualization of offenders, belie evidence-based practices, overlook
evidence of pro-social inter-offender relationships, and promote a superficial application of
criminological theory. 20
Perhaps more troubling, offender no-association conditions may actively inhibit the
reentry process. Studies suggest that incarceration often leads to reclusion and social withdrawal,
reactions that can hinder an offender’s reintegration.21 Offender no-association conditions further
isolate former inmates by curtailing their contacts with those who perhaps best understand the
pains of imprisonment and the pitfalls of reentry. Empirical research and experiential evidence on
strengths-based approaches to reentry tend to demonstrate that former offenders benefit from
interactions with other former offenders.22 In particular, data demonstrate that former offenders
can cultivate pro-social relationships, help one another through struggles, and make valuable
societal contributions.23 Thus, by curtailing inter-offender contacts, offender no-association
conditions seemingly undermine the rehabilitative goal of parole, calling into question the nexus
between the professed purposes of such conditions and their actual impact.
Part II chronicles the history of offender no-association conditions and presents the
results of the first nationwide survey focused solely on those conditions. Part III describes the
justifications for offender no-association conditions and details prior legal challenges to their
imposition. Part IV highlights the antiquated conceptualizations of prohibited associates and
parolees that drive offender no-association conditions, noting their inconsistency with evidencebased parole practices. Part V questions the theoretical flaws underpinning offender noassociation conditions, flaws that overlook social science research and endorse a misapplication of
criminological theory. Part VI outlines the implications of offender no-association conditions,
suggesting that such restrictions foreclose strength-based approaches to reentry and fail to serve
the rehabilitative goal of parole, making them vulnerable to legal attack in their current form. Part
VII concludes by highlighting the value of individualized parole conditions and proposing a more
tailored, less burdensome form of offender no-association condition that promotes rehabilitation
and strengthens the nexus between the restriction and the rehabilitative goal of parole.
I. THE WORLD OF OFFENDER NO-ASSOCIATION CONDITIONS: PAST AND PRESENT

Parole generally takes two forms: discretionary and mandatory.24 Indeterminate
19
See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 5, at 9-9 (“Irrespective of one’s views on the etiology of crime, virtually
everyone would agree that some criminal activity may be fostered by an offender’s particular social milieu.”).
20

See infra Parts IV and V.

21

See CURT R. BARTOL & ANNE M. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 326-36 (3d ed. 2004); see also Craig
Haney, The Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implications for Post-Prison Adjustment 9, 15-16 (Dec. 2001),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/75001/Haney.pdf. [https://perma.cc/3RTA-JE44].
22
See generally Thomas P. LeBel, An Examination of the Impact of Formerly Incarcerated Persons
Helping Others, 46 J. OFFENDER REHAB. 1 (2007); Thomas P. LeBel et al., Helping Others as a Response to Reconcile a
Criminal Past, 42 CRIM. JUST. AND BEHAV. 108 (2015).
23

See infra Part IV.

24

See COHEN, supra note 5, at 1-4 n.8; see also Travis III & Stacey, supra note 6, at 604 (“Whether release
is the result of a discretionary decision by a paroling authority, or after serving a definite sentence, a period of supervision
typically follows.”); GLAZE & BONCZAR, supra note 2, at 2 (“Parole is a period of conditional supervised release in the
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sentences make inmates eligible for discretionary parole after serving part of an imposed term of
incarceration.25 For inmates subject to parole as part of a determinate sentence, supervision begins
only after the completion of a mandatory prison sentence.26 In each instance, an offender’s
freedom is contingent upon his or her compliance with supervision conditions.27 Supervisory
agencies or commissions set the conditions of discretionary parole, while mandatory parole
involves conditions normally established by the sentencing judge.28
Courts have held that parole authorities and sentencing judges have broad discretion
when developing supervision conditions.29 Yet, that discretion is theoretically limited. Legislation
governing supervision conditions affords varying degrees of latitude.30 Some statutes effectively
grant carte blanche to parole authorities and sentencing judges in determining supervision
conditions,31 while other statutes prescribe a number of required conditions.32 Nevertheless, many
community following a prison term. It includes parolees released through discretionary or mandatory supervised release
from prison, those released through other types of post-custody conditional supervision, and those sentenced to a term of
supervised release.”).
25

See Parole, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Bryan A. Garner, ed., 9th ed. 2009) (“The conditional release of
a prisoner from imprisonment before the full sentence has been served. Although not available under some sentences,
parole is usually granted for good behavior on the condition that the parolee regularly report to a supervising officer for a
specified period.”); COHEN, supra note 5, at 1-4 (“Parole, unlike probation, begins after an offender has completed service
of part of a prison term”); Melinda K. Blatt, Comment, State Liability for Injuries Inflicted by Parolees, 56 U. CIN. L. REV.
615, 615 (1987) (“The classic definition of parole describes parole as the ‘release of an offender from a penal or
correctional institution, after he has served a portion of his sentence, under the continued custody of the state and under
conditions that permit his reincarceration in the event of misbehavior.’” (citing CARNEY, supra note 5, at 154)).
26
For example, in the federal criminal justice system, offenders sentenced after November 1, 1987, are
subject to a form of post-incarceration described as “supervised release.” The sentencing judge, in accordance with statute
and the United States Sentencing Guidelines, imposes the conditions of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583, U.S.S.G.
§ 5D1.3.
27
See infra Figure 1; infra Appendix; see also COHEN, supra note 5, at 4 (“If a parole condition is breached,
the offender can be returned to prison for the remaining part of the original term.”).
28

See text supra notes 25, 26.

29

See e.g., United States v. Nestor, 461 F. App’x 177, No. 11-2238, 2012 WL 402015, at *2 (3d Cir. Feb.
9, 2012) (“A District Court has broad discretion to impose conditions of supervised release.”) (federal supervised release
following imprisonment); Malarik v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 25 A.3d 468, 470 (Commw. Ct. Pa. 2011)
(“The Board has broad discretion to administer the parole laws, and the Court will defer to the Board’s interpretation of its
regulations if it is consistent with statutory authority and is not clearly erroneous.”) (parole); see also COHEN, supra note 5,
at 7-11 (“Courts and parole authorities . . . normally are given wide discretion to determine under what conditions a
parolee or probationer is to be released and returned to society.”).
30

COHEN, supra note 5, at 7-21 (“Statutory limits on probation and parole conditions are based on the
principle that both are legislative creations, and accordingly, such conditions must be authorized by statute.”) (citations
omitted).
31
Id. at. 7-22 (noting that such statutes are “the most general, namely, authorizing the court or board to
impose appropriate probation or parole conditions; few, if any, specific conditions are suggested.”);
32

Id. at 7-22 to -23 (describing these types of statutes stating, “The second category of probation and parole
statutes is more specific, dictating a few mandatory conditions and authorizing the decision maker to impose others as
appropriate. . . . The third type of statute . . . lists as many as 15 specific conditions which a court may, but is not required
to, impose.”); see e.g., MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 791.7730 (1996) (listing only 4 mandatory conditions of parole and stating
at (4), “A paroled prisoner shall comply with the conditions of parole contained in the parole order and with all subsequent
conditions approved by the chairperson of the parole board.”); see also W. VA. CODE § 90-2-2 (2.12) (2007) (listing 18
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statutes permit parole authorities and field agents to impose additional restrictions.33 In this way,
legislation theoretically meant to curb variation sometimes leads to discrepancy.34
In practice, jurisdictions usually adhere to a set of “standard” conditions that apply to all
parolees.35 This collection of conditions includes those required by statute and those uniformly
imposed by parole agents.36 Across, and sometimes within jurisdictions, the number and type of
standard supervision conditions vary considerably.37 Some of the most common conditions
include: obey all laws, seek and maintain employment, report any change of address or
occupation, notify parole officer prior to travel, comply with all parole officer instructions, and
submit to warrantless searches of home and person.38
No-association conditions are popular standard parole conditions,39 generally restricting
associations with either individuals or classes.40 Conditions that limit contact with individuals
typically prohibit supervisees from associating with co-defendants or victims.41 Conditions that
limit parolees’ contacts with classes can take many forms. In the past, no-association conditions
have prohibited contact with motorcycle clubs,42 Irish groups,43 homosexuals,44 and protestors.45
supervision conditions and stating, “A parolee or probationer must abide by any special written requirements imposed by
his or her parole officer.”).
33

COHEN, supra note 5, at 7-23 (“To give the decisionmaker discretion to set terms other than those
specifically noted, these statutes may also include a catchall provision which authorizes the imposition of other reasonable
conditions.”).
34

See id. at 7-22 n.2; 7-24 n.9. Two New Jersey cases on the validity of conditioning probation on the
payment of restitution also illustrate this point: compare State v. Newman, 623 A.2d 1355, 1364 (N.J. 1993) (“absent
specific statutory authorization, restitution may not be imposed as a sanction . . . “), with State v. Bausch, 416 A.2d 833
(N.J. 1980) (catchall applied to permit restitution in a probation case).
35

See COHEN, supra note 5, at 7-34 (“Many courts and parole boards have adopted a list of standard
conditions which, unless specifically modified, are applicable in every case.”).
36

See id. at 7-24 – 7-27.

37

See Travis III & Stacey, supra note 6, at 606.

38

See id.; see also JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME 82 (2003) (listing as common parole
conditions: “reporting to the parole agent within 24 hours of release, not carrying weapons, reporting changes of address
and employment, not traveling more than 50 miles from home or not leaving the county for more than 48 hours without
prior approval from the parole agent, obeying all parole agent instructions, seeking and maintaining employment or
participating in education/work training, not committing crimes, and submitting to search by the police and parole
officers”).
39
See Travis III & Stacey, supra note 6, at 606 (highlighting that 60% of U.S. jurisdictions impose a
standard offender no-association condition as part of parole).
40

See COHEN, supra note 5, at 9-15 – 9-18.

41

See United States v. Roberts, 229 F. App’x 172, No. 07-1371, 2007 WL 210402 (3d Cir. Jul. 9, 2007)
(codefendant); Erickson v. State, 824 P.2d 725 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (victim); People v. Brockelman, 933 P.2d 1315
(Colo. 1997) (victim); Allen v. State, 645 So. 2d 579 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (codefendant); Matthews v. State, 506.
App. S.E.2d 225 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (victim); State v. Pease, 758 P.2d 764 (Mont. 1988) (victim); People ex rel. Lee v.
New York State Bd. of Parole, 561 N.Y.S.2d 930 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (victim); State v. Quackenbush, 841 P.2d 671
(Or. Ct. 1992) (codefendant); Barlip v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 405 A.2d 1338, 1339 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (victim).
42

See LoFranco v. United States Parole Comm’n, 986 F. Supp. 796, 798 (S.D. N.Y. 1997).

43

See Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554, 556 (9th Cir. 1974).

44

See U.S. v. Kohlberg, 472 F.2d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973).
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Offender no-association conditions are class-based restrictions, normally prohibiting
parolees’ associations with one or more of the following groups: 1) other parolees, 2) convicted
criminals, and/or 3) convicted felons.46
A. Isolating Parolees: A Long History

Parole is a descendant of the “ticket of leave” system established by the English Penal
Servitude Act of 1853.47 Developed by Britain as a tool for managing its Australian penal
settlements, the ticket of leave system made inmates eligible for conditional release on a “license
to be at large.”48 This license required former prisoners to abide by nine conditions, and the third
read: “[h]e shall not habitually associate with notoriously bad characters, such as reported thieves
and prostitutes.”49 The license further stipulated that “if [the license holder] associates with
notoriously bad characters . . . it will be assumed that he is about to relapse into crime, and he will
be at once apprehended and recommitted to prison under his original sentence.”50
In the United States, the origins of parole link to the “emergence of indeterminate
sentencing” schemes in the late 1800s.51 Initially used to relieve prison overcrowding and manage
inmates, parole—as a form of early release—spread to all U.S. jurisdictions by 1930.52 Initially,
post-release supervision was not an integral part of the parole process.53 Yet, with the emergence
of the rehabilitative ideal,54 parole supervision gained popularity and U.S. parole conditions were
born.55
To date, there have been five published surveys of standard parole conditions in the
United States.56 In 1956, Nat R. Arluke conducted the first.57 In that study, he identified twenty45

See U.S. v. Smith, 414 F.2d 630, 636 (5th Cir. 1969); U.S. v. Smith, 618 F.2d 280, 282 (5th Cir. 1980).

46

See infra Figure 1; infra Appendix; see also infra Part II.A.

47

A. Keith Bottomly, Parole in Transition: A Comparative Study of Origins, Developments, and Prospects
for the 1990’s, 12 CRIME AND JUST. 319, 327 (1990); Nat R. Arluke, A Summary of Parole Rules, 2 CRIME & DELINQ. 6, 6
(1956).
48

Arluke, supra note 47, at 6.

49

Id. at 7.

50

Id. at 6.

51

See Bottomly, supra note 47 at 321.

52

DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN
PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980).
53
Sheldon L. Messinger, John E. Berecochea, David Rauma, and Richard A. Berk, The Foundations of
Parole in California, 19(1) L. & SOC’Y REV. 69, 69 (1985).
54

See generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND
SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981).
55

See Messinger et. al, supra note 53.

56

See Arluke, supra note 47; see also Nat R. Arluke, A Summary of Parole Rules – Thirteen Years Later,
15 CRIME & DELINQ. 267 (1969); Lawrence F. Travis III & Edward J. Latessa, “A Summary of Parole Rules – Thirteen
Years Later”: Revisited Thirteen Years Later, 12 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 591 (1984); Jennifer L. Hartman, Lawrence F. Travis
III, and Edward J. Latessa, Thirty-Nine Years of Parole Rules, Paper Presented at Annual Meeting of Academy of Criminal
Justice Sciences (1996); Lawrence F. Travis III and James Stacey, A Half Century of Parole Rules: Conditions of Parole
in the United States, 2008, 38 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 604 (2010) (surveys were conducted at 13-year intervals beginning in
1956 with the last in 2008).
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four separate parole conditions, many of which mirrored those enforced as part of a “license at
large” nearly one hundred years prior.58 Notably, Arluke’s study reveals that forty-two
jurisdictions imposed an early form of offender no-association conditions, restricting “association
or correspondence with ‘undesirables’” or “persons with poor reputation.”59
Thirteen years later, Arluke again surveyed standard parole conditions.60 His results
showed an increase in the number, severity, and inconsistency of parole conditions at work in the
United States.61 Offender no-association conditions were no exception. In 1969, forty-eight
jurisdictions imposed some form of offender no-association conditions.62 The Chief of the New
Jersey Bureau of Parole, Arluke lamented the more punitive, controlling trend he uncovered and
suggested a reduction of conditions, offering England’s Criminal Justice Act (1967) and its five
parole rules as a model.63
In 1982, Lawrence F. Travis III and Edward J. Latessa recreated Arluke’s survey
(1984).64 Their study again highlighted the inconsistency of jurisdictional parole conditions.
Jurisdictions averaged seventeen standard conditions, ranging from a high of twenty-three to a
low of six.65 Overall, however, Travis and Latessa’s research revealed a trend reversal, showing
that a greater number of jurisdictions had limited rather than increased the number and variety of
imposed parole conditions.66 Offender no-association conditions reflected this trend, as only
twenty-six jurisdictions restricted offenders’ associations with convicted offenders in 1982.67
Researchers surveyed parole conditions again in 199668 and 2008.69 In 1996, Hartman et
al. found that the variety and number of parole conditions continued to drop.70 In keeping with
this trend, the number of jurisdictions imposing offender no-association conditions decreased
from twenty-six to twenty jurisdictions. Yet, Travis & Stacey’s 2008 survey demonstrated a return
to more control-oriented parole supervision.71 In that study, they found that conditions of parole
had once again increased in variety and number.72 Not surprisingly, offender no-association
57
See Arluke, supra note 47 (initial study included only the forty-eight continental states and 48
jurisdictions total).
58

Id. at 8.

59

Id. at 8, 10 (“Persons of poor reputation’ are specified generally as other parolees, ex-convicts, inmates of
any penal institution, persons having a criminal or police record, etc.”).
60

See Arluke, Thirteen Years Later, supra note 56 (study including Hawaii, Alaska, and the federal system
(51 jurisdictions total)).
61

Id.

62

Thirteen Year Later, supra note 56, at 270.

63

Id. at 274.

64

See Travis and Latessa, supra note 56. Travis and Latessa’s study included the District of Columbia (52
jurisdictions total).
65

Id. at 593.

66

Id. at 594-595.

67

Id.

68

See Hartman et al., supra note 56.

69

See Travis and Latessa, supra note 56. See also Travis and Stacey, supra note 6.

70

See Hartman et al., supra note 56.

71

See Travis and Latessa, supra note 56, at 608.

72

Id. supra note 56, at 606.
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conditions followed suit. In 2008, 60% of jurisdictions (thirty-one) imposed some form of
offender no-association condition.73
B. The Pervasiveness of Offender No-association Conditions – 2016-2017

In 2016-2017, I conducted a nationwide survey of standard offender no-association
conditions. That survey reveals that the number of states imposing such conditions has remained
relatively constant since 2008.74
Drawing on Travis and Latessa’s methodology,75 I began by conducting an Internet
search of parole department websites for all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the federal
system. For those jurisdictions that did not publish standard parole conditions, I emailed the
departmental website’s designated contact. In all instances, if an email to a parole official went
unanswered for two weeks, I sent a follow-up email. After one month, I placed phone calls to
officials who had not responded to email inquiries.
When categorizing offender no-association conditions, I diverged from prior research on
standard parole conditions. In prior parole conditions studies, researchers collapsed uniquely
worded offender no-association conditions into a broader category that included all offender noassociation conditions. In the present survey, I was able to preserve distinctions, dividing offender
no-association conditions into three categories.
Category 1 lists jurisdictions that restrict parolees’ associations with convicted offenders.
A jurisdiction is included in Category 1 if it restricts parolees’ associations with one or all of the
following groups: 1) other parolees, 2) convicted criminals, and/or 3) convicted felons.76 For
jurisdictions that use obscure language to describe prohibited associates (e.g. “those of
disreputable character”), I contacted departmental representatives to clarify their interpretation of
that language.77 When they indicated that the restriction applied to either other parolees, convicted
criminals, or convicted felons, I included that jurisdiction in Category 1.
Category 2 includes a related but distinct group of no-association conditions that restrict
parolees’ interactions with those actively engaged in criminal activities, gang members, and/or
inmates. These restrictions differ from those in Category 1 in important ways. Many members of a
gang are not convicted offenders. Moreover, while almost all inmates are convicted offenders, the
principal justification for such restrictions is seemingly prison security, not issues of criminogenic
73

Id.

74

See infra Appendix; infra Figure 1.

75

Id.

76

Unlike Arluke, Hartman et al., and Travis and Latessa, I did not distinguish between jurisdictions that per
se prohibited contact with other convicted offenders and those that required a parolee to seek out and obtain prior approval
from a field agent. I did not make this distinction because of the practical application of such a restriction. Many times,
parolees have very little contact with supervising agents or are shifted agents several times. This can hinder the parolee
agent relationship. Moreover, parole supervision is now less about counseling and more about surveillance, this places the
parolee and the parole officer at odds. For these reasons, I treated per se bans on associations and permissive associations
as functional equivalents.
77

For example, South Dakota forbids contact with “companions with criminal influences” while Texas
prohibits associations with “persons of disreputable character.” South Dakota interprets their restriction to include
convicted felons and other parolees. Conversely, Texas interprets their restriction to include only those actively engaged in
criminal activity. See infra note 314.
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influence.
Category 3 includes only Texas, the sole jurisdiction that imposes a standard offender
no-association condition that prohibits only associations with those actively engaged in criminal
activity.
Category 4 is comprised only of jurisdictions that do not impose a standard noassociation condition of any type, but do list a catchall provision allowing a field agent to impose
no-association restrictions. For jurisdictions this situation presented, I again contacted parole
officials for clarification. If a jurisdiction indicated that they uniformly impose an offender noassociation condition restricting parolees’ contact with other parolees, convicted criminals, or
convicted felons, that jurisdiction is part of Category 1. Category 3 includes only jurisdictions in
which offender no-association conditions are truly imposed on a case-by-case basis.
Figure 1: Offender No-Association Conditions by Jurisdiction

II. JUSTIFYING AND CHALLENGING OFFENDER NO-ASSOCIATION CONDITIONS

Parole represents a strange purgatory between incarceration and freedom.78 As the
Supreme Court explains, parolees do not enjoy “the absolute liberty to which every citizen is
78

See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972) (“Rather than being an ad hoc exercise of clemency,
parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals.”).
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entitled.”79 Rather, a parolee’s liberty is “conditional . . . dependent on observance of special
parole restrictions.”80 Thus, while physically unconfined, parolees are bound by their legal
status.81
In the past, when upholding supervision conditions that impinge on a parolee’s freedoms,
courts cited the grace, contract-consent, and custody theories of parole.82 Both the grace and
contract-consent theories of parole rest, in part, on the presumption that the state has the
unfettered choice to hold an inmate until the completion of his or her sentence.83 Under the grace
theory, in granting an inmate parole supervision, “the state has acted ex gratia and has conferred
no legally protected right to remain at liberty.”84 Similarly, the contract-consent theory of parole
posits that, “the state theoretically surrenders its power to retain the convict and grants him liberty
in consideration of the convict’s consent to be bound by any conditions the state may impose.”85
Differing slightly from the grace theory and contract-consent theory, the custody theory
of parole does not justify the diminution of a parolee’s freedoms by characterizing the state’s
motivation for paroling an inmate (i.e. an act of grace or adherence to a contract). Rather, the
custody theory of parole defines the contours of a parolee’s rights theorizing that parole “is in
legal effect imprisonment,”86 and holding that parolees are akin to prisoners while parole
supervision “is the administrative exercise of the prison discipline authority.”87 Hence, under the
custody theory, “though parole does have the effect of restoring liberty, that effect will be ignored
when the [state] deems the parolee’s liberty a threat to public safety.”88
In 1972, in Morrissey v. Brewer, the Supreme Court held that the state cannot deny

79

Id. at 480.

80

Id.

81

See Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. PENN. L. REV. 220, 288 (1971) (citing People v. Hernandez,
229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 149 (1965)) (describing a parolee as “constructively a prisoner . . . fettered by the conditions and
restrictions of his parole”).
82
See Steven Monteforte, Admissibility of Evidence in Probation/Parole Revocation Proceedings and in
Criminal Prosecutions: Applying a Single Standard, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 936, 942-43 (1982) (discussing the theories of
parole and their role in the limitation of parolees’ Fourth Amendment protections).
83

Note, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 702, 704 (1963)
(noting that the grace theory and the contract-consent theory, “as developed by the courts, rest[] upon a dual foundation.
First, that the parolee has been convicted and sentenced for crime and thus has been deprived of his liberty in accordance
with due process of law. Second, that the state has the uncontrolled option to require those convicted of crime to remain
imprisoned for the full length of their sentences.”) (citing Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32 (1899); In re Varner, 166 Ohio St.
340 (1957)); see also Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935) (dictum) (discussing the act of grace theory in the probation
context).
84

Note, supra note 83; see also Comment, supra note 11, at 286 (“Under the grace theory, both the
establishment of a parole system and the release of an individual prisoner are gratuitous acts by a merciful executive.”).
85
Note, supra note 83; see also Comment, supra note 11, at 287 (“When the parolee leaves the prison, he
often signs a form setting forth the conditions of his release. This formality has given rise to the contract theory. The
parolee accepts the conditions of his parole just as a party to a business contract agrees to be legally bound by its terms.”)
(citing Ex parte Edwards, 78 Okla. Crim. 213, 219-20 (1944)).
86

Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923).

87

Comment, supra note 11, at 288.

88

Note, supra note 83, at 711.
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parolees due process of law in the course of revoking a term of supervision.89 In doing so, the
Court implicitly rejected the grace, contract-consent, and custody theories of parole, refusing to
adhere to conceptualizations of parole that had previously served as the basis for unequivocally
ignoring parolees’ constitutional protections.90 In this way, the Court recognized that parolees’
retain some, albeit few, liberties.91
Yet, while defining parolees’ due process protections, the Court also explained that
parolees enjoy fewer liberties than do their non-parolee counterparts.92 The Court indicates that
when establishing conditions of parole, authorities can permissibly infringe upon certain protected
liberties.93 Specifically, the Court states “[t]o accomplish the purpose of parole, those who are
allowed to leave prison . . . are subjected to specified conditions. . . . These conditions restrict
their activities substantially beyond the ordinary restrictions imposed by law on an individual
citizen.”94
In Morrissey, the Court also points out that authorities have great latitude when
establishing and imposing parole conditions.95 Yet, the Court suggests that a permissible parole
condition must facilitate parole’s reintegration ideal, noting that the ultimate goal of parole “is to
help individuals reintegrate into society as constructive individuals as soon as they are able.”96
89

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (“We see, therefore, that the liberty of a parolee,
although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a ‘grievous loss’
on the parolee and often on others. It is hardly useful any longer to try to deal with this problem in terms of whether the
parolee’s liberty is a ‘right’ or a ‘privilege.’ By whatever name, the liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its termination calls for some orderly process, however informal.”).
90

United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez 521 F.2d 259, 265 n.15 (1975) (“Implicit in Morrissey is a rejection
of the custody and contract theories as justifications for summary revocations of parole.”); see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778, 782 n.4 (1973) (“It is clear at least after Morrissey v. Brewer, that a probationer can no longer be denied due
process, in reliance on the dictum in Escoe v. Zerbst, that probation is an ‘act of grace.’”) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972); Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935)). In Morrissey, the Court’s denunciation of the custody theory
of parole is explicit. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 483 (“Although the parolee is often formally described as being ‘in custody,’
the argument cannot even be made here that summary treatment is necessary as it may be with respect to controlling a
large group of potentially disruptive prisoners in actual custody.”).
91
See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482 (“We see, therefore, that the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate,
includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty. . . .”); see also id. at 496 (Douglas J., dissenting in part) (“A
parolee, like a prisoner, is a person entitled to constitutional protection, including procedural due process.”).
92

See id. at 480, 475 (noting that parolees do not enjoy the “full panoply of rights” afforded everyday

citizens).
93
Id. at 483 (“The State has found the parolee guilty of a crime against the people. That finding justifies
imposing extensive restrictions on the individual’s liberty.”).
94

Id. at 478.

95

See id. at 496 (Douglas J., dissenting in part) (“Parole, while originally conceived as a judicial function,
has become largely an administrative matter. The parole boards have broad discretion in formulating and imposing parole
conditions. ‘Often vague and moralistic, parole conditions may seem oppressive and unfair to the parolee.’ They are drawn
‘to cover any contingency that might occur,’ and are designed to maximize ‘control over the parolee by his parole
officer.’”) (citing R. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISIONS AS TO TYPE, LENGTH AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE 306307 (1969)).
96
Id. at 477; see also Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Pen. and Corr. Complex, 422 U.S. 1, 13 (1979)
(“It is important that we not overlook the ultimate purpose of parole which is a component of the long-range objective of
rehabilitation.”).
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The Court reiterated this standard in subsequent opinions,97 as have lower courts.98
Though the Morrissey Court recognized parolees’ due process protections in revocation
proceedings, it also ostensibly authorized the imposition of parole conditions that significantly
burden parolees’ freedoms. Contemplating the state’s interests at stake in Morrissey, the Court
tacitly approved of offender no-association conditions limiting interaction with other offenders,
noting “[t]ypically, parolees are forbidden to . . . have associations or correspondence with certain
categories of undesirable persons.”99 The Court went on to list other conditions that seemingly
won its approval.100
A. How and Why We Separate

Offender no-association conditions are almost always categorical, forbidding a parolee
from contact with other parolees, convicted criminals, and/or convicted felons.101 As a standard
condition of parole, offender no-association conditions apply to all parolees and all potential
offender associates, failing to distinguish charge type, prior criminal history, or length of prison
stay for either the parolee or potential offender associates.102
Justifying offender no-association conditions, courts and commentators cite a need to
separate supervisees from those who may promote criminal activity thereby threatening the
reintegration process. As one commentator explains, “[i]rrespective of one’s views on the etiology
of crime, virtually everyone would agree that some criminal activity may be fostered by an
offender’s particular social milieu.”103 Other convicted offenders are allegedly detrimental to the
success of supervisees.104
97
See Greenholtz 422 U.S. at 7-8 (“[T]o insure that the state-created parole system serves the publicinterest purposes of rehabilitation and deterrence, the state may be specific or general in defining the conditions for
release. . . .”).
98

See, e.g., Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1242 n.20 (1977) (“It is only the dual mandate of correctional
officers to rehabilitate their clients and to protect society that justifies an intrusion into the privacy of the released
offender.”); Felce v. Fielder, 974 F.2d 1484, 1500 (1992) (“[T]he state’s interest is substantial: the protection of the
public—including a parolee’s family and community—from antisocial acts of a parolee, as well as the parolee’s
reassimilation and rehabilitation.”).
99

Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 478.

100

Id. (citing Nat R. Arluke, A Summary of Parole Rules – Thirteen Years Later, 15 CRIME & DELINQ. 267,
272-73 (1969)) (noting “[t]ypically, also they must seek permission from their parole officers before engaging in specified
activities, such as changing employment or living quarters, marrying, acquiring or operating a motor vehicle, travling [sic]
outside the community, and incurring substantial indebtedness. Additionally, parolees must regularly report to the parole
officer to whom they are assigned and sometimes they must make periodic written reports of their activities.”).
101

See infra Figure 1; Appendix; see also, e.g., SOUTH CAROLINA BOARD OF PAROLES AND PARDONS,
POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL 32 (2017) (“I shall not associate with any person who has a criminal record, or any
other person whom my Agent has instructed me to avoid.”), https://www.dppps.sc.gov/content/download/
120663/2749351/file/Parole#Board#Manual#June#7#2017.pdf.
102

See SOUTH CAROLINA BOARD OF PAROLES AND PARDONS, POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL 32
(2017), https://www.dppps.sc.gov/content/download/120663/2749351/file/Parole#Board#Manual#June#7#2017.pdf.
103

COHEN, supra note 5 at § 9.5, p. 9.9.

104

See Jones v. State, 41 P.3d 1247, 1259 (2002) (noting “[i]t has long been recognized that criminal
activity may be fostered by an offender’s association with certain individuals who encourage criminality.”); see also
United States v. Crea, 968 F. Supp. 826, 829 (1997) (noting that conditions forbidding contact with former offenders are
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For example, a standard condition of federal supervised release states:
You must not communicate or interact with someone you know is engaged in
criminal activity. If you know someone has been convicted of a felony, you
must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first
getting the permission of the probation officer.105
In support of this condition, the government states:
The purpose of this condition is to prevent antisocial relationships and to
encourage prosocial relationships. It provides defendants with a justification to
avoid associating with persons convicted of felonies and may deter future
criminal conduct that may be jointly undertaken with those persons.106
The government’s justification suggests that inter-offender relationships are incompatible
with the prosocial relationships supervised release endorses. The condition also tends to
infantilize supervisees, intimating that they do not have the requisite skills to determine the
difference between pro and anti-social relationships, however defined. Moreover, the purpose of
the condition suggests an equivalency between ‘criminally involved’ and ‘convicted felon.’
The Supreme Court notes that offender no-association conditions—like all alternatives to
incarceration generally—are meant to curb “the contaminating influence of association with
hardened or veteran criminals.”107 This argument further asserts that other offenders “may serve as
cocriminals or teachers, or otherwise encourage the offender to violate the criminal law.”108 In this
way, offender no-association conditions seemingly endorse a decidedly sociological theory of
crime, assuming that crime is, in part, learned and that one’s peers can significantly impact
criminality.
B. Legal Challenges to Offender No-association Conditions

Though usually upheld, since Morrissey, offender no-association conditions have
frequently been the target of attack. The overwhelming majority of claims leveled at offender noassociation conditions divide into two types. Most often, litigants claim that offender noassociation conditions are impermissibly vague and violative of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.109 Less often, litigants allege that offender noassociation conditions unduly burden their First Amendment freedom of association in that they
are overbroad and fail to meet the professed goals of parole.
imposed “to prevent a convicted defendant from associating with those who would lead him back to a life of crime.”).
105
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, PROBATION AND PRETRIAL SERVICES
OFFICES, OVERVIEW OF PROBATION AND SUPERVISED RELEASE CONDITIONS 32 (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/overview_of_probation_and_supervised_release_conditions_0.pdf.
106

Id.

107

United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 357 (1928) (discussing the original purpose of probation as an
alternative to incarceration).
108

COHEN, supra note 5, at § 9.5, p. 9.9.

109

See COHEN, supra note 5, at 9:15-9:18.
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1. Vagueness Challenges

Vagueness challenges to offender no-association conditions typically focus on two
issues: 1) the meaning of “association” and 2) whether a supervisee must “know” that an
individual falls within the class of prohibited associates.
Courts have held that supervision conditions may permissibly lack specificity: for
example, the First Circuit has held that while a supervisee “is entitled to notice of what behavior
will result in a violation, so that he may guide his actions accordingly . . . [c]onditions . . . do not
have to be cast in letters six feet high, or to describe every possible permutation, or to spell out
every last, self-evident detail.”110 In turn, supervision conditions “may afford fair warning even if
they are not precise to the point of pedantry. In short, conditions . . . can be written—and must be
read—in a commonsense way.”111 Very rarely have offender no-association conditions failed to
meet this rather loose standard.
In Arciniega v. Freeman, the Supreme Court took up—for the first and only time—the
issue of an offender no-association condition.112 The challenged condition prohibited a parolee
from “associating” with ex-convicts.113 In that case, the petitioner was working in a kitchen with
several employees who also had criminal records. The Court held that business-related contacts
did not rise to the level of “association” contemplated by the no-association condition at issue.
Instead, the Court noted that to uphold Arciniega’s violation “would be to render a parolee
vulnerable to imprisonment whenever his employer, willing to hire ex-convicts, hires more than
one.”114 Subsequent holdings by lower courts have firmly established the principle that systematic
associations are required to support a finding that a parolee has breached a no-association
condition.115
Parolees have also challenged offender no-association conditions on the grounds that
such conditions are vague because they do not require that parolees know the status of prohibited
acquaintances. For example, some statutes prohibit parolees from associating with other parolees
or those with criminal records.116 Still other conditions forbid parolees from associating with those
110

United States v. Gallo, 20 F.3d 7, 12 (1993).

111

Id.; see also United States v. Dane, 570 F.2d 840, 843 (1977); Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S.
385, 391 (1926) (first enunciating the “common intelligence” standard).
112

Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4 (1971).

113

Id.

114

Id.

115

See United States v. Lovelace, No. 07–50098, 2007 WL 4354443 at *775-76 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2007)
(expanding the requisite level of contact that will support a violation of parole, stating “‘associate’ encompasses types of
contact less formal than face-to-face meetings with explicit agreement to join together in a common purpose”); United
States v. Ferruccio, Nos. 95-4281, 96-3612, 1997 WL 137374 at *2 (N.D. Ohio Mar 27, 1997) (upholding the parole
violation and noting “Ferruccio’s concession that the meetings took place, coupled with the additional evidence regarding
the meetings, clearly shows that Ferruccio was engaged in prohibited association with convicted felons. The meetings were
more than ‘incidental contacts’ and they were not a mere ‘occupational association’ for Ferruccio to work on a ‘legitimate
job.’”); Alessi v. Thomas, 620 F.Supp. 589, 593 (1985) (holding that contacts must be “sustained and extensive”); United
States v. Bonanno, 452 F.Supp. 743, 752 (1978) (quoting United States v. Albanese, 554 F.2d 543, 546 n.5 (1977)) (stating
“[a]n ‘association’ within the context of parole or probation conditions must be more than an incidental contact.”); see also
Birzon v. King, 469 F.2d 1241, 1243 (1972).
116

See infra Figure 1; infra Appendix.
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of “disreputable character.”117 These conditions often lack a scienter requirement,118 offering
parolees little guidance when attempting to abide by imposed supervision conditions. Addressing
this issue, courts have held that a constitutionally valid violation of supervised release requires
that a supervisee “knowingly” associate with members of a discernable prohibited class.119
2. Overbreadth Challenges

A second variety of challenges to offender no-association conditions argue that such
conditions unduly burden a parolee’s First Amendment freedom of association as they are
overbroad and unrelated to the twin goals of parole—the protection of the public and the
promotion of successful reintegration. Though such challenges rarely succeed, a recent Ninth
Circuit decision suggests that courts have begun to demand a stronger nexus between offender noassociation conditions and the purposes of parole.120 Most courts faced with challenges to
offender no-association conditions have adopted a version of the federal standard for assessing the
constitutionality of supervision conditions. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (d), a condition of Federal
supervised release must “(1) be reasonably related to the goals of deterrence, protection of the
public, and/or defendant rehabilitation; [and] (2) involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is
reasonably necessary to achieve those goals.”121 To achieve these goals, courts have also held that
117

See, e.g., TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE – PAROLE DIVISION, PAROLE IN TEXAS 18 (2017)
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/bpp/publications/PIT_2017_Eng.pdf.
(“Rules of release may include . . . avoid[ing] persons or places of disreputable or harmful character. . . .”).
118

See, e.g., MO. CODE. STATE REGS. TIT. 14, § 80-3.010(5) (“Association: I will obtain advance
permission from my probation and parole officer before I associate with any person convicted of a felony or misdemeanor,
or with anyone currently under the supervision of the Board of Probation and Parole. It is my responsibility to know whom
I am associating.”); STATE OF MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, PROBATION AND PAROLE BUREAU, CONDITIONS
OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, SPECIAL CONDITIONS, CONDITION 21, https://leg.mt.gov/content/Committees/Interim/20132014/Law-and-Justice/Meetings/February-2014/Exhibits/conditions-parole-doc-board.pdf.
(“Association: I will not associate with probationers, parolees, prison inmates, or persons in the custody of any law
enforcement agency. . . .”); STATE OF NEVADA, DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND PUBLIC SAFETY, BOARD OF
PAROLE COMMISSIONERS, PAROLE AGREEMENT 6, http://parole.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/parolenvgov/content/Meetings/
Proposed%20Parole%20Agreement%20-%20Draft.pdf (“Associates: You shall not associate with convicted felons,
persons who are engaged in criminal activity. . . .).
119
See Bonanno, 452 F.Supp. at 752 (holding that an association limiting contact to only “law abiding
persons” did not encompass a person convicted more than 12 years); People v. Garcia, 19 Cal. App. 4th 97, 102-03 (1993)
(holding unconstitutional a “condition that appellant not associate with any felons, ex-felons or sellers or users of
narcotics,” and noting “[w]e know of no case, and respondent cites none, dealing with a probation condition prohibiting
association with persons not known to be felons or ex-felons. A condition of probation that prohibits appellant from
associating with persons who, unbeknownst to him, have criminal records or use narcotics, is . . . an unconstitutional
restriction. . . .”); People v. Patel, 196 Cal. App. 4th 956, 960 (2011) (stating “there is now a substantial uncontradicted
body of case law establishing, as a matter of law, that a probationer cannot be punished for presence, possession,
association, or other actions absent proof of scienter.”); United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 377 (2015) (holding
that a condition of release is vague when it bars a defendant from “associat[ing] with any person convicted of a felony,
unless granted permission. . . .”).
120

See, e.g., United States v. Napulou, 593 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a probation
condition forbidding association with all misdemeanants was impermissibly overbroad).
121

Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (d)).
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supervision conditions must be reasonably related to the conduct for which the supervisee was
convicted.122 Moreover, when a condition burdens a parolee’s fundamental right to associate,123
such conditions must be narrowly tailored to serve the protective and rehabilitative functions of
parole.124
In most instances, often without extensive explanation, courts have held that offender noassociation conditions relate to the twin goals of parole. For instance, in a recent Seventh Circuit
case, United States v. Speed, two cousins challenged an offender no-association condition on the
grounds that it would prevent them from freely associating with one another and with members of
their immediate family. As the Court explains:
Rico and Jermaine do not object to the ban on interacting with people who are
actually committing crimes, but they appeal the prohibition on interacting with
people convicted of felonies. This is not an abstract argument. The cousins, who
will enter supervised release as felons themselves, urge that this condition will
restrict their constitutional freedom of association with people in their family
and community. For that matter, the condition prevents them from interacting
with each other during their terms of supervised release, unless their probation
officers grant permission.125
The Seventh Circuit denied the appellant’s request to invalidate the condition.
Specifically, the court stated, “[t]he Speeds do not cite any cases on how this condition violates
the Constitution, however, and we do not find any grounding for their argument . . . [o]n the
contrary, prohibiting contact with felons is not an unusual federal condition of supervised release,
particularly where probation officers can approve the requested contact.”126 Here, the Seventh
Circuit focused on the tradition of offender no-association conditions and seemed to suggest that
122
See, e.g., Jones v. State, 41 P.3d 1247, 1258 (Wyo. 2002) (probation context) (stating “probation
conditions must be reasonably related . . . to the criminal conduct for which the probationer was convicted . . . “) (citing
Lansing v. State, 669 P.2d 923, 927–28 (Wyo. 1983)).
123
Courts are split as to whether no-association conditions of any kind implicate the supervisee’s First
Amendment freedom of association. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 670 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1982) (finding that
restrictions prohibiting associations with the “Wyoming Patriots,” an anti-tax organization, did implicate First Amendment
freedom of association); but see Albanese, 554 F.2d 543 at 547 (noting “a probationer’s freedom of association may be
restricted in pursuit of legitimate probation objectives . . . and it is clear that a condition restricting association with
persons with criminal records does not violate the First Amendment . . . thus, appellant’s conduct was unprotected.”)
(citing Malone, 502 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1974); Birzon, 469 F.2d 1241, 1243 (2d Cir. 1972)).
124
See United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975) (in a challenge to a
probation condition that implicated the Fourth Amendment, the court held “[w]hile it must be recognized that probationers,
like parolees and prisoners, properly are subject to limitations from which ordinary persons are free, it is also true that
these limitations in the aggregate must serve the ends of probation. Conditions that unquestionably restrict otherwise
inviolable constitutional rights may properly be subject to special scrutiny to determine whether the limitation does, in
fact, serve the dual objectives of rehabilitation and public safety. But this is not to say that there is any presumption,
however weak, that such limitations are impermissible. Rather, it is necessary to recognize that when fundamental rights
are curbed, it must be done sensitively and with a keen appreciation that the infringement must serve the broad purposes of
the Probation Act.”).
125

United States v. Speed, 811 F.3d 854, 859 (7th Cir. 2016).

126

Id. at 860.
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because a probation/parole authority can allow inter-offender contact, that such a condition is
constitutionally permissible.
III. FORMER OFFENDERS: IRREDEEMABLE AND HOMOGENOUS?

Calling into question their necessity and efficacy, standard offender no-association
conditions are premised on two tenuous presumptions about former offenders. First, such
restrictions presume that prohibited associates are immutable. Because such restrictions are
categorical, barring supervisees from having contact with all other parolees, convicted criminals,
and/or convicted felons, they ostensibly presume that prohibited associates are irreparably flawed,
in that they are perpetually prone to encourage, commit, and justify criminal behavior. This view
of prohibited associates reflects an untenable conceptualization of former offenders. Second,
standard offender no-association conditions presume that all parolees share the dynamic
criminogenic need of criminal associations, a need that increases risk level and demands an
offender no-association condition. This view of supervisees and their professed needs belies
individualized, evidence-based parole policies.
A. Prohibited Associates: The Criminal Others

Purportedly appealing to “practical logic and commonsense,”127 categorical offender noassociation conditions that bar contact with all other parolees, convicted criminals, and/or
convicted felons, seemingly suggest that prohibited associates are unchanging, forever prone to
engage in criminality.128 Yet, research suggests that such a conception of criminal offenders is
antiquated and unfounded.
The notion that criminal offenders are unchanging finds historical support in the work of
Aristotle, who argued that, “criminals who break laws cannot govern themselves.”129 Aristotle
saw crime as a choice that reveals character, suggesting that one chooses good or bad character
through autonomous actions.130 Further, “[o]nce a person [chooses] their character . . . he or she
[i]s not free to simply undo the choice.”131 In this way, crime is the result of a character flaw that
is “an inelastic concept”132 or a “stable collection of traits.”133
Echoing these sentiments in his 1974 study of prisoner rehabilitation efforts, Martinson
famously exclaimed, “nothing works.”134 Today, though they have been largely discredited,135
127

Turnbull & Hannah-Moffat, supra note 9, at 543.

128

Ekow N. Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, Equality and the Irrelevance of
Moral Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 1028 (2004) (“Current penal practices reflect the
perception of criminals as a permanent caste of moral inferiors.”).
129
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, 935, 972-73 (Richard McKeon
ed., 28th ed. 1941).
130

Id.

131

Id.

132

Yankah, supra note 128, at 1027.

133

Id. at 1028.

134

Ronald Martinson, What Works: Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 THE PUB. INTEREST

22, 48 (1974).
135

Paul Gendreau & Bob Ross, Effective Correctional Treatment: Bibliotherapy for Cynics, 25 CRIME &
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Martinson’s ‘findings’ still shape common conceptualizations of criminal offenders. Many view
offenders as fundamentally distinct “boogeymen” without the capacity for positive change.136
Taking this view, offenders are “not quite human.”137 Instead, convicted offenders are their
criminal history.138
Criminologist David Garland has termed this view of criminal offenders the
“criminology of the other.”139 Accordingly, he argues, offenders are “opaquely monstrous
creatures beyond or beneath our knowing.”140 Thus, the criminology of the other is seldom
rational, built instead on generalizations and stereotypes about criminal offenders that demand
their banishment and separation.141 Instead of data, the criminology of the other relies on
“‘natural’ sentiments of retributive justice and the common sense of ordinary people,” 142 at its
core assuming once a criminal always a criminal.143
Explaining the instinct to ‘other’ criminal offenders, Garland notes “to treat [offenders]
as understandable . . . is to bring criminals into our domain, to humanize them, to see ourselves in
them and them in ourselves.”144 Therefore, as criminologist Shadd Maruna points out, there are
social purposes for conceiving of criminal offenders as evil, immutable entities.145 By doing so,
non-criminals create a common, consistent enemy that validates their status and gives them the
ability to justify and minimize their own deviance.146 Moreover, such a conception makes
exclusion and isolation understandable and, more insidiously, desirable.
Public policies often reflect this conception of criminal offenders. In the vast world of
record-based collateral sanctions, criminal offenders are seemingly irredeemable entities. For
example, blanket civic restrictions banning convicted felons from voting,147 serving on juries,148
DELINQ. 463 (1979); Rick Sarre, Beyond ‘What Works?’ A 25-year Jubilee Retrospective of Robert Martinson’s Famous
Article, 34 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 38 (2001).
136

DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY

SOCIETY (2001).
137

ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 5 (1963).

138

HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1963); JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989).
139

GARLAND, supra note 136, at 184.

140

Id.

141

Simon Hallsworth, Rethinking the Punitive Turn: Economies of Excess and the Criminology of the
Other, 2 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 145, 146 (2000).
142

GARLAND, supra note 136, at 184.

143

See Shadd Maruna & Anna King, Once a Criminal, Always a Criminal?: ‘Redeemability’ and the
Psychology of Punitive Public Attitudes, 15 EUR. J. CRIM. POLICY RES. 7, 7-24 (2009).
144

GARLAND, supra note 136, at 184.

145

SHADD MARUNA, MAKING GOOD: HOW EX-CONVICTS REFORM AND REBUILD THEIR LIVES (2001).

146

Id.

147

See generally JEFF MANZA & CHRIS UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2006).
148

See generally James M. Binnall, Summonsing Criminal Desistance: Convicted Felons’ Perspectives on
Jury Service, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 4 (2017); James M. Binnall, A Field Study of the Presumptively Biased: Is There
Empirical Support for Excluding Convicted Felons from Jury Service?, 36 U. DENV. LAW & POL’Y 1 (2014); See Brian C.
Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65 (2003).
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and running for office,149 presume that convicted felons possess flaws that make them
permanently unsuitable to take part in vital civic processes. Similarly, federal and state weapons
laws assume that all convicted felons, regardless of offense type, lack the care and thoughtfulness
to be responsible gun owners.150 Restrictions on public housing,151 public benefits,152 and
occupational licensing153 also highlight the perceived immutability of those with a criminal
history. In all instances, the proffered goal of these restrictions is to protect non-criminals from
convicted offenders who will allegedly and inevitably, one day return to crime.
Likewise, offender no-association conditions promote the ‘othering’ of convicted
offenders. In a majority of jurisdictions, offender no-association conditions restrict parolees’
contacts with all convicted criminals, convicted felons, and/or parolees, even those who have long
since broken the law. This presumes that offenders never truly change and that convicted criminal,
convicted felon, and parolee are somehow apt equivalents for “actively engaged in criminal
activity.”
Yet, research suggests that most convicted offenders eventually stop offending and
engage in a process of criminal desistance.154 That process is often marked by life changes that
can include marriage, schooling, children, and a measured change in self-concept, whereby a
former offender reconciles a criminal past with a law-abiding present and future.155 In this way,
much like their non-criminal counterparts, convicted offenders evolve over time, frequently
altering their behaviors. Blanket offender no-association conditions that make categorical
presumptions about the immutability and criminality of convicted felons, convicted criminals, and
other parolees fail to adequately account for these potential changes and run counter to
rehabilitative evidence-based efforts.
B. Parolees’ Needs: Homogeneity Overcomes Individuality

In recent years, “evidence-based practices” have permeated the mission statements of
149
See generally Andrea Steinacker, Prisoner’s Campaign: Felony Disenfranchisement Laws and the Right
to Hold Public Office, 2003 BYU L. REV. 801 (2003).
150

Alec C. Ewald, Collateral Consequences in the American States, 93 SOC. SCI. Q. 211 (2012).

151

See generally Meghan L. Schneider, From Criminal Confinement to Social Confinement: Helping ExOffenders Obtain Public Housing with a Certificate of Rehabilitation, 36 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
335 (2010).
152

See generally Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of
Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457 (2010); Naomi F. Sugie, Punishment and Welfare: Paternal Incarceration and
Families’ Receipt of Public Assistance, 90 SOC. FORCES 1403 (2012).
153

See generally Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a Constitutional Framework
for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People with Criminal Records, 7 J. L. SOC’Y 18 (2005).
154

See generally SHADD MARUNA, MAKING GOOD: HOW EX-CONVICTS REFORM AND REBUILD THEIR
LIVES (2001); ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING: PATHWAYS AND TURNING POINTS
THROUGH LIFE (1995); Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Age and the Explanation of Crime, 89 AM. J. SOC. 552
(1983); John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Understanding Desistance from Crime, 28 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2001).
155

John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Turning Points in the Life Course: Why Change Matters to the
Study of Crime, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 301, 310 (1993); Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, Life-Course Desisters?
Trajectories of Crime Among Delinquent Boys Followed to Age 70, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 301 (2003); Mark Warr, LifeCourse Transitions and Desistance from Crime, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 183, 187 (1998).
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parole supervision regimes in the United States.156 As part of this evidence-based approach,
roughly seventy percent of parole agencies have implemented risk-need-response (RNR)
principles.157 Jurisdictions that employ RNR principles assess parolees’ risk levels by identifying
their criminogenic needs.158 Criminogenic needs take two forms–static and dynamic.159 Static
needs are characteristics of an offender’s history that are unchanging; while, dynamic needs are
characteristics of an offender’s present situation that are alterable.160 To measure a parolee’s
needs, jurisdictions use risk assessment tools.161
In theory, once a risk assessment tool has identified the parolee’s needs, jurisdictions
then craft a tailored response to those needs, with the goal of decreasing a client’s risk level.162 In
this way, individualized responses to criminogenic needs ought to address a parolee’s unique
deficits.163Still, though RNR principles call for tailored parole supervision plans, many
jurisdictions fail to adequately address a parolee’s distinctive needs.164 Instead, jurisdictions take a
156

See generally JAMES Q. WILSON & JOAN PETERSILIA, CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY (2011); FAYE S.
TAXMAN & STEVEN R. BELENKO, IMPLEMENTING EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS AND
ADDICTION TREATMENT (2012); NANCY M. CAMPBELL, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, COMPREHENSIVE
FRAMEWORK FOR PAROLING AUTHORITIES IN AN ERA OF EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE (2008).
157

See Paul Gendreau et. al., Intensive Rehabilitation Supervision: The Next Generation in Community
Corrections?, 58 FED. PROBATION 72 (1994); See also Dana A. Jones et. al., Case Classification in Community
Corrections: Preliminary Findings from a National Survey, in Topics in Community Corrections 4-10 (1999); James R.P.
Ogloff & Michael R. Davis, Advances in Offender Assessment and Rehabilitation: Contributions of the Risk-NeedsResponsivity Approach, 10 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 229 (2004); Don A. Andrews et. al., Classification for Effective
Rehabilitation: Rediscovering Psychology, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 19 (1990); Don A. Andrews, Enhancing Adherence
to Risk-Need-Responsivity: Making Quality a Matter of Policy, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 595 (2006).
158

See generally DON A. ANDREWS & JAMES BONTA, THE PSYCHOL. OF CRIM. CONDUCT 176 (Anderson
Publishing 1994) (explaining the relationship between risks and needs: “Many offenders, especially high-risk offenders,
have a variety of needs. They need places to live and work and/or they need to stop taking drugs. Some have poor selfesteem, chronic headaches or cavities in their teeth. These are all ‘needs’. The need principle draws our attention to the
distinction between criminogenic and non-criminogenic needs. Criminogenic needs are a subset of an offender’s risk level.
They are the dynamic attributes of an offender that, when changed, are associated with changes in the probability of
recidivism.”); DAVID THORNTON & D. RICHARD LEWIS, COGNITIVE APPROACHES TO THE ASSESSMENT OF SEXUAL
INTEREST IN SEXUAL OFFENDERS (2009).
159

See generally THORNTON & LEWIS, supra note 158.

160

Id.

161

See, e.g., Don A. Andrews & James Bonta, The Level of Service Inventory-Revised, Multi Health
Systems
(1995),
http://issuu.com/mhs-assessments/docs/ls-cmi.lsi-r.brochure_insequence?e!20431871/45044118
[https://perma.cc/TWF7-26RA] (describing the Level of Service Inventory – Revised (LSI-R) one of the first, most
popular, and most validated risk assessment tools); see also Don A. Andrews, James L. Bonta, & J. Stephen Wormith,
Level of Service/Case Management Inventory (LS/CMI): An Offender Assessment System, Multi Health Systems 2 (2004)
(describing the Level of Service/Case Management Inventory, a revised version of the Level of Service Inventory –
Revised (LSI-R)).
162
See generally Don A. Andrews & James Bonta, Rehabilitating Criminal Justice Policy and Practice, 16
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 39 (2010).
163
See id.; see also Tracey A. Vieira, Tracey A. Skilling, & Michele Peterson-Badali, Matching CourtOrdered Services with Treatment Needs: Predicting Treatment Success with Young Offenders, 36 CRIM. JUST. AND
BEHAV. 385 (2009).

2006),

164
See, e.g., Joan Petersilia & Robert Weisberg, “Parole in California: It’s a Crime,” L.A. TIMES (April 23,
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/apr/23/opinion/op-petersilia23 [https://perma.cc/PMK6-LSSX] (“But more
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more generalized approach, imposing parole conditions that address what supervising authorities
perceive as global needs of its client base.165 Blanket offender no-association conditions contradict
RNR’s individualized approach to parole supervision.
Conversely, in a study of Canadian federal parole conditions, Turnbull and HannahMoffett note that Canadian parole authorities rigorously implement RNR principles and target
specific offender needs by applying tailored conditions.166 Parole officials then explain the nexus
between those needs and imposed parole conditions.
You will not be allowed to communicate with any person who has a criminal
record, who is involved in drug trafficking or part of organized crime because it
has been determined that, in the past, you committed your crimes with such
peoples or under their influence. In order not to commit a subsequent offence it
is imperative that you have no contact with other delinquents.167
Turnbull and Hannah-Moffett also note that, unlike blanket restrictions, “[t]his targeted
approach . . . is premised on a logic of governance that is more rational, cost-efficient and modest
in its efforts to address social problems.”168 A large body of empirical research supports this
contention, demonstrating the effectiveness of strict adherence to the individualized feature of
RNR principles.169
Yet, with respect to standard offender no-association conditions, most U.S. parole
authorities seemingly disregard evidence validating the RNR approach. Standard offender noassociation conditions suggest that parolees share a universal dynamic criminogenic need. While
consistent with antiquated views of ‘criminal others,’ this presumption runs counter to RNR
principles. As some researchers note, “the greatest obstacle to using rehabilitative treatment
effectively to reduce criminal behavior is . . . a correctional system that does not use the research
available and has no history of doing so.”170
Like other blanket parole conditions, standard offender no-association conditions
superficially serve the rehabilitative goal of parole. Assuredly, many parolees are susceptible to
criminal influence. Yet, for many other parolees, criminal influence is not a dynamic risk factor.
For such parolees, categorical offender no-association conditions are superfluous and potentially
detrimental to their reintegration.

selective supervision of parolees also requires more effective rehabilitation programs. Studies show that for some
prisoners, enrollment in drug- or alcohol-abuse treatment programs, education classes or job training will substantially
lower their chances of committing new crimes. Unfortunately, California is woefully inadequate in providing such
programs. Nearly two-thirds of its inmates are addicts, yet just 2% of them are professionally treated while in prison.”).
165
See generally David J. Cooke & Christine Michie, Limitations of Diagnostic Precision and Predictive
Utility in the Individual Case: A Challenge for Forensic Practice 34 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 259 (2010).
166

See Turnbull & Hannah-Moffett, supra note 9, at 532.

167

Id. at 542.

168

Id. at 538.

169

See Don A. Andrews et al., Does Correctional Treatment Work: A Clinically Relevant and
Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 369, 369-387 (1990).
170

Mark W. Lipsey & Francis T. Cullen, The Effectiveness of Correctional Rehabilitation: A Review of
Systematic Reviews, 3 ANN. REV. OF L. AND SOC. SCI. 297, 315 (2007).
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IV. INTER-OFFENDER ASSOCIATIONS: ANTI-SOCIAL AND CRIMINOGENIC?

Also implicit in categorical offender no-association conditions are two additional flawed
presumptions about the nature of inter-offender relationships and predictors of criminality. First,
in the face of evidence to the contrary, offender no-association restrictions presume that interoffender relationships are uniformly anti-social. Such a presumption contradicts empirical and
experiential data that makes clear that inter-offender relationships can be pro-social and
reformative. Second, offender no-association conditions incorrectly presume that anti-social
associations are dispositive predictors of criminal activity. This presumption misconstrues
criminological theories of learned criminal behavior, demonstrating that in the face of strong prosocial associations, anti-social relationships will have a negligible impact on criminality.
A. Inter-Offender Associations: Ignoring Data

For decades, researchers have recognized the benefits of inter-offender relationships. In
1955, sociologist/criminologist Donald Cressey suggested that relationships between prisoners
and former prisoners could aid in rehabilitation and reentry.171 Through a process he termed
“reflexive reformation,” offenders, who are immersed in inter-offender rehabilitative efforts, feel
compelled to conform their behavior to the pro-social group norm.172 Later studies in the
substance abuse treatment context support these findings, demonstrating that the “professional ex”173 or “wounded healer”174 paradigm benefits formerly addicted counselors and their clients by
providing “a reference group whose moral and social standards are internalized.”175
Though scant, empirical research on former offenders who take on the professional exor wounded healer role seems to point to similar benefits. For example, LeBel explored the
helper/wounded healer orientation in a study of 228 former offenders involved in a prison
reintegration program.176 LeBel found that the majority of participants endorsed the characteristics
of the helper/wounded healer, “sharing experiences, acting as a role model, mentoring others, and
[expressing an] interest in pursuing a career helping others.”177 He also found that a majority of
former offenders who counseled other former offenders, those recently released from prison or
otherwise less advanced in their reintegration, were more likely to express satisfaction with life

171
Donald R. Cressey, Changing Criminals: The Application of the Theory of Differential Association, 61
THE AM. J. OF SOC. 116, 119 (1955); see generally Donald R. Cressey, Social Psychological Foundations for Using
Criminals in the Rehabilitation of Criminals, 2 J. OF RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 49 (1965).
172

Cressey, Changing Criminals, supra note 171, at 119; see generally Frank Reissman, The Helper
Therapy Principle, 10 SOC. WORK 27 (1965) (identifying the “helper principle” in the field of social work, which refers to
the benefits the “helper” receives when engaged in in a counselor/counselee or mentor/mentee relationship).
173
See generally J. David Brown, The Professional Ex-: The Alternative for Exiting the Deviant Career, 32
SOC. Q. 219 (1991).
174

See generally William L. White, The History of Recovered People as Wounded Healers: II. The Era of
Professionalization and Specialization, 18 THE HIST. OF ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT Q. 1 (2000); see also MARUNA, supra
note 139.
175

Brown, supra note 173, at 227.

176

See LeBel, supra note 22.

177

Id. at 16-17.
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and less likely to possess a criminal attitude.178 As he notes, “becoming more involved in helping
others appears to have a positive impact on the psychological well-being of formerly incarcerated
persons and possibly acts as a sort of buffer against criminality as well.”179
In a more recent study of former offenders and the wounded healer orientation, LeBel,
Richie, and Maruna surveyed 258 participants (229 clients and 29 staff members) from six reentry
service organizations in New York City and Upstate New York.180 In that study, they found that
former offenders who worked as staff members exhibited prosocial attitudes and beliefs, a sense
of psychological well-being, and a general satisfaction with life.181 These findings have also been
replicated in the context of female former offenders182 and former sex offenders.183 In sum,
limited empirical research on inter-offender self-help groups makes clear that former offenders
who work to aid other formerly incarcerated citizens gain an increased sense of self-worth,
express more prosocial attitudes, and are less likely to engage in criminal activity.
Along with empirical data on inter-offender relationships, experiential data supports the
notion that offender associations can aid in the reentry process. For those who work in the reentry
field, employing former offenders to facilitate the reentry of other former offenders is not a novel
idea. A number of initiatives aimed at facilitating the successful reentry of former offenders
employ former offenders as counselors and mentors.184 Two of the oldest and most successful of
these initiatives are Delancey Street Foundation in San Francisco, California and Homeboy
Industries in Los Angeles, California.185
Founded in 1971 in San Francisco by criminologist Mimi Silbert and former offender
John Maher, Delancey Street Foundation is “the country’s leading residential self-help
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organization for former substance abusers, ex-convicts, homeless and others who have hit
bottom.”186 The Delancey Street Foundation is a self-described “extended family” that employs no
experts or program administrators. Instead, at Delancey, clients serve as mentors and mentees,
“[e]veryone is both a giver and a receiver in an ’each-one-teach-one’ process.”187
Delancey Street’s approach centers on the notion that residents, former offenders
included, are fully capable of altering their behavior and living a law-abiding life. “First and
foremost, we believe people can change. . . .[w]hen we make a mistake we need to admit it and
then not run from it, but stay and work to fix the mistake.”188 Delancey also prioritizes the
strengths of its residents, rather than focusing on risks and needs. “We teach people to find and
develop their strengths rather than only focusing on their problems.”189 Through this strengthsbased or restorative approach to reentry,190 Delancey Street Foundation has achieved enormous
success. To date, Delancey has served over 14,000 former offenders and recovering addicts.191 Of
those who graduate, ninety percent never return to drugs or crime.192
Like Delancey Street Foundation, Homeboy Industries also employs former offenders as
counselors and mentees. Founded in 1988 by Father Greg Boyle and located in Los Angeles,
California, Homeboy Industries offers wrap around services for at-risk youth, former gang
members, and recently incarcerated men and women. They provide job training; mental health,
substance abuse, and domestic violence services; educational opportunities; and even tattoo
removal. An ongoing study by UCLA Professors Jorja Leap and Todd Franke found that of the
300 Homeboy alumni they began tracking in 2008, only 1 in 3 have been re-incarcerated, a
marked improvement over the statewide recidivism rate of approximately 67 percent.193
The success of the Delancey Street Foundation and Homeboy Industries has not
immunized them from the impact of offender no-association conditions. While California does not
impose a standard offender no-association condition, field agents are permitted to make
association determinations on a case-by-case basis.194 In April 2012, California probation officers
reportedly forbid a number of probationers from participating in activities at Homeboy Industries.
Probation officers cited restrictions limiting contact with former gang members and convicted
offenders.195 In response to this informal policy, Father Greg Boyle stated, “[t]hat’s akin to telling
186
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an alcoholic he’s not allowed to go to AA because there will be other alcoholics there . . . [i]t
makes zero sense.”196
In this case, the restrictions at issue were not the result of a top down directive, but rather
an informal policy of a handful of probations officers.197 Nevertheless, Father Boyle’s point is
salient. Homeboy relies on former offenders and former gang members to mentor and counsel
those just beginning their reentry journey. Taking away this resource harms the men and women
who look to the employees of Homeboy Industries to show them the way.
Though scant, empirical and experiential data strongly suggest that mutual-help models
of former offender reentry work, helping to maintain successful reentry for counselors and for
initiating the successful reentry process for the counselees. Offender no-association conditions
make efforts by organizations like Delancey Street and Homeboy exceedingly more difficult, as
former offenders are less likely to seek out help from other former offenders in the face of a
restriction that, if violated, can lead to re-imprisonment.
B. Misconstruing Criminological Theory

A final flaw inherent in categorical offender no-association conditions is that they
ostensibly presume that anti-social associations are dispositive predictors of crime. While some
criminological theories demonstrate that one’s social milieu plays a significant role in criminality,
those same theories also make clear that anti-social associations alone are not necessarily
predictive of criminality.198
By presuming that anti-social associations impact criminality, offender no-association
conditions seemingly promote learning theories of crime. Social process theories of crime
“examine how individuals interact with other individuals and groups and how the learning that
takes place in these interactions leads to a propensity for criminal activity.”199 One strain of social
process theory is learning theory.200 Learning theories of crime explore how and why anti-social
associations lead to crime.201 The two oldest and most empirically validated learning theories are
differential association theory and social learning theory.202
Derived from symbolic interactionist principles,203 Sutherland’s differential association
theory is the foundation for social learning theory. Premised on nine principles, differential
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association theory holds that crime is learned through interactions with others.204 In particular
differential association states, “[a] person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions
favorable to violation of law over definitions unfavorable to violation of law.”205 In short,
differential association holds that interactions with others, in particular intimate associations with
close relatives and friends, can influence criminality. Thus, criminality can be averted when prosocial relationships outweigh anti-social associations.
Importantly, differential association does not identify or address the exact mechanisms
for how criminal behavior is learned, except to acknowledge that criminal behavior is learned
through the same mechanisms that humans learn all other behavior.206 Responding to such
criticisms, Burgess and Akers proposed social learning theory, a modification of differential
association theory that incorporates behavioral psychology principles of operant conditioning,
modeling, and imitation.207 Social learning theory proposes that criminal behavior is learned
through processes of “differential reinforcement,”208 whereby one balances the benefits and costs,
both real and anticipated, of any given behavior and through imitation, modeling one’s behavior
after another.209
Superficial interpretation of social learning theory mistakenly overlooks its complexities
and nuances.210 Social learning theory is “deeply rooted in a sociological, symbolic-interactionist
framework that situates humans within social contexts through their associations with a variety of
social groups.”211 The theory examines how an individual’s behaviors are shaped by his or her
exposure to multiple, often competing, social groups. It accounts for cognitive learning
mechanisms, and factors influencing learning. In this way, the theory is a holistic theory of crime.
Though arguably the most empirically validated criminological theory, social learning is
often oversimplified. Ronald Akers, one of the authors of social learning theory, points out that
social learning is sometimes reduced to a “peer-influence” theory of crime, “reducing the entirety
of the social learning model to only a peer-influence theory is . . . problematic.”212 Akers goes on
to explain the holistic quality of social learning theory and the importance of accounting for all
facets of the theory:
In addition to peer association, the theory clearly refers to various primary and
secondary group influences, especially the family. . . . The family provides
204
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exposure to normative values, behavioral models, and differential
reinforcement. Variables such as parental control, discipline, and management
are clearly also measures of differential social reinforcement (rewards and
punishments) for conforming or disobedient behavior.213
Offender no-association conditions endorse learning theories of crime, yet this
endorsement is tepid. Such restrictions consider only one half of one facet of learning theories –
anti-social peer associations—ignoring many other aspects of learning theories that can exacerbate
or mitigate anti-social peer associations, and are, in turn, determinative of criminality. As Akers
warns, incorporating and relying on social learning theory, focusing only on peer associations, “is
as if this one variable operationalized the entire theoretical model.”214 To accurately predict the
criminality of parolees, jurisdictions ought to alter how they conceive of social learning theory,
crafting parole supervision plans that address not only possible anti-social associations, but also
pro-social associations, the strength of those associations, and the mechanisms through which
behavior is learned. Only then will social learning theory truly inform parole policy.
To curb anti-social, criminogenic relationships among parolees, a vast majority of
jurisdictions impose standard offender no-association conditions. The effectiveness of such
conditions is speculative, as they lack empirical support. Instead, such conditions are premised on
unsubstantiated, inaccurate presumptions about former offenders and their relationships. These
flawed bases on which offender no-association conditions rest call into question the policy
implications and legality of categorically prohibiting parolees’ associations with other parolees,
convicted criminals, and/or convicted felons.
V. OFFENDER NO-ASSOCIATION CONDITIONS: BAD POLICY AND QUESTIONABLE LAW

Categorical offender no-association conditions foreclose the cultivation of pro-social,
inter-offender associations. In turn, such conditions curtail a jurisdiction’s ability to fully invest in
strengths-based approaches to reentry and may undermine former offenders’ efforts to desist from
criminal activity. In this way, standard offender no-association conditions fail to serve the
rehabilitative goal of parole, likely making them impermissibly overbroad in their current form.
A. Defeating Strengths-Based Reentry

Parole suffers from fundamental, philosophical inconsistencies that limit its successes.215
The twin goals of parole, as enunciated by the Supreme Court and interpreted by lower courts, are
themselves somewhat incongruous.216 Protecting the public and promoting reintegration are often
in conflict.217 Likewise, so too are the central tenets of the RNR model, a model employed by the
213
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overwhelming majority of parole agencies in the United States.218 Criminogenic risks implicate
what Shadd Maruna has termed a “control narrative,”219 while criminogenic needs suggest a
“support narrative.”220 The coexistence of these dueling narratives, in theory and in application,
often results in inefficiency, confusion, and failure.221
Describing the current state of parole, one author suggests:
The underlying problems that exist within the parole system are theoretical in
nature. The combination of currently often incompatible supervision styles of
casework and surveillance and an overwhelming societal concern for public
safety, possibly compounded by fears of legal liability, have created an anomic
state of parole in the United States.222
Accordingly, some scholars have questioned the continued use of RNR principles in the
reentry context.223 In particular, scholars suggest that along with their somewhat contradictory
aims, RNR principles do little to recognize former offenders qualities and positive attributes.224
Instead, RNR principles seem to focus solely on the deficiencies of former offenders and their risk
of reoffending.225 By ignoring, or at least failing to emphasize former offenders’ strengths, parole
regimes that employ RNR principles tend to overlook the reformative power of exploiting such
strengths through generative commitments.226
Conversely, a strengths-based approach to reentry acknowledges former offenders’
218
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talents and abilities, rather than their risks and needs.227 A strengths-based approach to reentry and
parole treats criminal offenders as “assets to be managed, rather than merely liabilities to be
supervised.”228 Strengths-based reentry practices differ from traditional RNR or ‘what works’
principles in that they identify parolee’s positive attributes, utilize those attributes, and then
recognize how those attributes contribute to the community.229 Proponents of strengths-based
approaches argue that they are more in line with research on successful criminal desistance.230
Drawing from Edwin Lemert’s theory of deviance,231 Maruna et al. propose that criminal
desistance divides into two phases: primary desistance and secondary desistance.232 Under this
framework, primary desistance refers to a “lull or crime-free gap in the course of a criminal
career,”233 while secondary desistance is the cessation of criminal activity coupled with a
prosocial change in a former offender’s self-concept.234 Thus, the key distinction between primary
and secondary desistance are “identifiable and measurable changes at the level of personal identity
or the ‘me’ of the individual.”235
The impetus of such changes, however, has been the topic of some debate.236 Structurecentric views of criminal desistance suggest that life-course “turning points,”237 such as
marriage238 and employment,239 serve as “triggering events”240 that prompt identity shifts by
227
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thrusting former offenders into conventional adult roles.241 Exposed to prosocial interactions,
former offenders who commit to conventional roles undergo a change in their sense of self. Role
commitment also gives rise to informal social controls, isolating former offenders and
discouraging criminal activity.242 In these ways, conventional role commitment facilitates identity
transformations by providing former offenders a template for individualized change,243 while
“knifing them off” from criminogenic situations and influences.244
Yet, some scholars question structure-centric views of identity change and criminal
desistance, arguing that such perspectives undervalue the role of agency, conceiving of former
offenders as passive, malleable entities shaped by the world around them and desistance as a
somewhat random occurrence.245 Critics contend that former offenders are active participants in
their own reform, contemplating their future and often devising a plan to achieve their goals.246
Taking this view, turning points and conventional roles are merely “structural supports”247 or
“hooks for change”248 that are effectual only when a former offender has done the “upfront
work”249 of personal transformation.250
Emphasizing the former offender’s part in the desistance process, a number of scholars
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note the importance of a desistance “narrative.”251 As King explains, “it is the building of a
desistance narrative which underpins the development of new identities.”252 For example,
Maruna’s research tends to show that former offenders alter their self-images through the use of
“redemption scripts.”253 These scripts give former offenders “a believable story of why they are
going straight to convince themselves that this is a real change.”254 Engaging narratives to reconceptualize their criminal pasts, former offenders are able to account for prior criminality while
emphasizing a new, reformed identity. Similarly, Paternoster and Bushway suggest that a shift in
self-image requires an offender to actively cast-off a criminal identity and embrace a new, lawabiding persona.255 In both instances, the “agentic moves”256 of the former offender are crucial to
the construction of the narrative and the formation of a new self-concept.
Though the “structure-agency” debate colors criminal desistance research, most scholars
agree that desistance does not result from simply social forces or intrinsic motivations.257 Rather,
the criminal desistance process is reflexive, combining environmental and individual elements of
varying intensities at various times.258 A strengths-based approach to reentry that champions interoffender associations does just that, giving former offender mentors a platform to build a coherent
desistance narrative, using a deviant past as a resource when assisting less adjusted former
offender mentees. For the mentees, they are provided a roadmap from those who have
successfully navigated reentry obstacles. In these ways, inter-offender associations and a
strengths-based approach to parole and reentry facilitate the processes and mechanisms associated
with successful criminal desistance.
Though data on the link between inter-offender associations and criminal desistance is
admittedly scarce, the research that exists on the topic makes clear that inter-offender
relationships can be pro-social and mutually beneficial. Still, most jurisdictions do not utilize
these beneficial relationships in parole supervision. Under a strengths-based regime, such
relationships are exploited, for the good of the offender and for the good of the community.
Instead, through categorical offender no-association conditions, the vast majority of jurisdictions
preemptively destroy inter-offender mutual-help initiatives and undermine strength-based reentry
possibilities.259
251
See MARUNA, supra note 139; Giordano et al., supra note 229; Vaughan, supra note 229; Paternoster &
Bushway, supra note 240; Sam King, Early Desistance Narratives: A Qualitative Analysis of Probationers’ Transitions
Towards Desistance, 15(2) PUNISHMENT AND SOC’Y 147 (2013).
252

King, supra note 250, at 152.

253

MARUNA, supra note 145, at 87.

254

Id. at 86.

255

Paternoster & Bushway, supra note 245, at 1107-08.

256

Giordano et al., supra note 234, at 992.

257
Vaughan, supra note 234, at 390; see also Stephen Farrall, Rethinking What Works with Offenders:
Probation, SOC. CONTEXT & DESISTANCE FROM CRIME 223, (2002); Maruna et al. supra note 232; LeBel et al. supra note
236; Stephen Farall, Gilly Sharpe, Ben Hunter, and Adam Calverly, Theorizing Individual and Structural Level Processes
in Desistance and Persistence: Outlining an Integrated Perspective, 44(2) AUST. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 218, 218- 234
(2011).
258

See Beth Weaver, The Relational Context of Desistance: Some Implications and Opportunities for
Social Policy, 46(4) SOC. POL’Y & ADMIN. 395 (2012); LeBel et al. supra note 236.
259
Other scholars have noted the negative aspects of offender no-association conditions. See LeBel, supra
note 22a, at 17 (noting that former offenders who are still under correctional supervision including parole or another form
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B. No Nexus: The Legal Vulnerability of Standard Offender No-Association Conditions

Offender no-association conditions implicate supervisees’ First Amendment right to
freedom of association.260 Accordingly, such conditions must be narrowly drawn to serve the twin
goals of parole.261 The flawed bases for blanket offender no-association conditions and their
potentially negative impact on an offender’s reintegration suggest an anemic nexus between the
professed purposes of parole and measures that prohibit offender interaction.
In the context of offender no-association conditions that prohibit contact with all
misdemeanants, courts have demanded a more significant nexus between offender no-association
conditions and the purposes of supervised release. For example, in Napulou v. United States, a
federal supervisee violated a special condition of supervised release that prohibited contact with
convicted misdemeanants.262 Napulou challenged the condition on the basis that it was overbroad
and did not relate to the twin goals of federal supervised release.
In their analysis, the Ninth Circuit suggested that no-association conditions—even those
targeting convicted felons—might be vulnerable to such an attack. The Court noted, “[a] person
disobeying the law today and hence not being law-abiding may as yet have no criminal record,
and a person with a past record may be entirely law-abiding today.”263 The Ninth Circuit went on
to conclude that a person with a misdemeanor conviction “may not pose any threat to Napulou’s
rehabilitation or to public safety.”264 Thus, an offender no-association condition barring all contact
with misdemeanants is overbroad, unduly burdening Napulou’s freedom of association.265
While no-association conditions barring contact with other parolees, convicted criminals,
and/or convicted felons are almost always upheld, Napulou provides the framework for a
potentially successful challenge. Such restrictions significantly burden supervisees’ First
Amendment freedom of association. Yet, such restrictions are far from precise. As the Second
Circuit Court noted in Albanese, a parolee, a convicted criminal, and/or a convicted felon may
have broken the law in the past, but may be entirely law abiding currently. In this way, such a
restriction has virtually no nexus to the rehabilitative goal of parole. Instead, categorical offender
no-association conditions rest on blanket presumptions about the homogeneity and unchanging
criminality of former offenders, the nature of inter-offender relationships, and assumed results of
anti-social relationships.
VI. CONCLUSION

For many parolees, readjusting to a world from which they were plucked, sometimes for
a number of years, makes succeeding on the outside exceedingly difficult. As a former offender, I
of post-incarceration supervision were less likely to take on the role of a helper or wounded-healer).
260
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (recognizing the right to associate for the purposes of
engaging in activities protected by under the First Amendment); see also U.S. Const. amend I, XIV.
261

See text supra note 19.

262

See United States v. Napulou, 593 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2010).

263

Id. (citing United States v. Furukawa, 596 F.2d 921, 922-23 (9th Cir.1979) (quoting United States

v. Albanese, 554 F.2d 543, 546 (2d Cir.1977))).
264

Id.

265

See id.
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understand the struggles of those who have suffered a period of incarceration. Since my own
release, I have made efforts to help those citizens recently returning from a period of
incarceration. Unfortunately, offender no-association conditions have made those efforts difficult,
and in some cases, impossible.
Perhaps recognizing the flaws inherent in categorical offender no-association conditions,
several jurisdictions have chosen to enforce far more tailored standard parole conditions that
target anti-social, inter-offender associations. In those jurisdictions, prohibited associates include
only “those actively engaged in criminal activity.”266
By altering standard offender no-association conditions in this way, jurisdictions avoid
‘othering’ former offenders, honor individualized evidence-based practices, acknowledge the
existence of pro-social inter-offender relationships, and accurately employ social learning theory.
Moreover, by prohibiting parolees from associating with those who are ‘actively engaged in
criminal activity,’ jurisdictions stop infantilizing former offenders and genuinely prioritize
rehabilitation, at last creating a nexus between ‘criminally involved’ no-association conditions and
the twin goals of parole. Such an approach genuinely promotes criminal desistance and saves noassociation conditions from possible constitutional infirmity.

266

See infra Appendix (Florida, Kansas, North Dakota, and Texas all restrict parolees from associating with
those “actively engaged in criminal activity”).
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APPENDIX:
OFFENDER NO-ASSOCIATION RESTRICTIONS BY JURISDICTION

Federal: Convicted Felons267
Alabama: Convicted Criminals268
Alaska: Convicted Felons269
Arizona: Other Supervisees270
267
The federal criminal justice system abolished federal parole for offenders sentenced before November 1,
1987. For offenders sentenced after that date, the only form of post-release supervision is “supervised release.” See
UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL COURTS, PROBATION AND PRETRIAL SERVICES, COMMONLY USED TERMS (Apr. 22,
2015),
https://web.archive.org/web/20150422073310/http://www.uscourts.gov:80/FederalCourts/ProbationPretrialServices/Com
monlyUsedTerms.aspx [https://perma.cc/793H-QZ3V] (defining supervised release as “a term of supervision served after a
person is released from prison. The court imposes supervised release during sentencing in addition to the sentence of
imprisonment. Unlike parole, supervised release does not replace a portion of the sentence of imprisonment but is in
addition to the time spent in prison. U.S. probation officers supervise persons on supervised release.”). The mandatory
conditions of federal supervised release are statutory and do not include a required association condition. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(d) (2018) (making no mention of a mandatory association condition but stating “the court may order, as a further
condition of supervised release . . . any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of probation in section 3563(b)(1)
through (b)(10) and (b)(12) through (b)(20), and any other condition it considers to be appropriate”); 18 U.S.C. § 3563
(b)(6) (2018) (“The court may provide, as further conditions of a sentence of probation . . . that the defendant . . . refrain
from frequenting specified kinds of places or from associating unnecessarily with specified persons.”). Yet, the United
States Sentencing Guidelines lists several “standard conditions” recommended as additional conditions of supervised
release. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO SUPERVISED RELEASE 10 (2010) (“To
implement fully the statutorily required conditions of supervised release and provide useful guidance on reasonable
discretionary conditions of supervision that will facilitate an offender’s successful reentry, the Guidelines Manual [United
States Sentencing Guidelines] sets forth required and suggested conditions of supervised release.”),
http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research_Publications/Supervised_Release/20100722_Supervised_Release.pdf.
The
Sentencing Guidelines lists an association condition as a “standard condition” of supervised release. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL. § 5D1.3(c)(8) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N) (approved Sep. 21, 2018) (listing, as a standard
condition of federal supervised release, “the defendant shall not communicate or interact with someone the defendant
knows is engaged in criminal activity. If the defendant knows someone has been convicted of a felony, the defendant shall
not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the probation officer”).
268

ALA. CODE. § 15-22-29 (b)(4) (1975) (“The Board of Pardons and Paroles shall adopt general rules with
regard to conditions of parole and their violation and may make special rules to govern particular cases. Such rules, both
general and special, shall include, among other things, a requirement that . . . [h]e shall abandon evil associates and
ways”). In a follow-up email, a representative clarified the meaning of the condition, explaining, “evil associates” is
construed as “convicted criminals.”
269

ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 33.16.150 (a)(10) (2018) (“As a condition of parole, a prisoner released on
special medical, discretionary, or mandatory parole . . . may not contact or correspond with anyone confined in a
correctional facility of any type serving any term of imprisonment or a felon without the permission of the parole officer
assigned to a parolee”).
270

ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR., CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION AND RELEASE (“I will not knowingly associate
with any person engaged in criminal activity, codefendants, or anyone under the jurisdiction of ADC [Arizona Department
of Corrections] or Probation or in the custody of any law enforcement agency without prior authorization or permission
from my Supervising Officer.”) (on file with the author). See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-411 (E) (2018) (“The
board may also impose any conditions of parole it deems appropriate in order to ensure that the best interests of the
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Arkansas: Convicted Felons271
California: Discretionary272
Colorado: Convicted Criminals273
Connecticut: Gang Members274
Delaware: Discretionary275
prisoner and the citizens of this state are served.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-411.01 (D) (2018) (“The board of
executive clemency may revoke the prisoner’s release if the prisoner violates the conditions of supervision that are
imposed by the board or the state department of corrections.”).
271

ARK. PAROLE BD., POLICY MANUAL, ARKANSAS BOARD OF PAROLE CONDITIONS OF RELEASE at 25
(2015) (“You must not associate with convicted felons, persons who are engaged in criminal activity, or other persons with
whom your supervising officer instructs you not to associate. (Association with convicted felons at work, in counseling
programs, in church, or in other locations and circumstances specifically approved by the Parole Board or your supervising
officer is not prohibited)”). See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-712 (a)(1) (2018) (“The Parole Board shall establish written
policies and procedures governing the supervision of parolees designed to enhance public safety and to assist the parolees
in reintegrating into society.”); ARK. PAROLE BD., POLICY MANUAL, SUPERVISION OF PAROLEES 16 (2015) (“Every
parolee, while on release, shall be subject to the orders of the Board. Failure to abide by any of the conditions as instructed
may result in revocation of his/her conditional release.”). ARK. PAROLE BD., POLICY MANUAL, ARKANSAS BOARD OF
PAROLE CONDITIONS OF RELEASE at 25 (“You must not associate with convicted felons, persons who are engaged in
criminal activity, or other persons with whom your supervising officer instructs you not to associate. (Association with
convicted felons at work, in counseling programs, in church, or in other locations and circumstances specifically approved
by the Parole Board or your supervising officer is not prohibited)”) (Amended Dec. 3. 2015); also available at:
http://www.sos.arkansas.gov/rulesRegs/Arkansas%20Register /2010/Oct10Reg/158. 00.10-001.pdf.
272

STATE OF CAL., DEP’T OF CORR. AND REHAB., NOTICE AND CONDITIONS OF PAROLE 3 (makes no
mention of a standard association condition but provides a blank area in which authorities can list the special conditions of
parole). See also STATE OF CAL., DEP’T OF CORR. AND REHAB., DIV. OF ADULT PAROLE OPERATIONS, SPECIAL
CONDITIONS OF PAROLE, 2-3 (listing several possible special conditions that prohibit parolees from having contact with
sex offenders, co-defendants, or a “member or associate of a prison gang, disruptive group, or street gang.” The Special
Conditions of Parole Addendum also contains several blank boxes that allow the supervising agent to add unlisted special
conditions.)
273

COLO. CRIM. JUST. REFORM COALITION, GETTING ON AFTER GETTING OUT – A REENTRY GUIDE FOR
COLORADO, UNDERSTANDING PAROLE at 49 (“You may not associate with anyone with a criminal record without the
permission of your parole officer.”). See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-22.5-404 (1) (a) (2018) (“The risk of reoffense
shall be the central consideration by the state board of parole in making decisions related to the timing and conditions of
release on parole or revocation of parole”). See also COLO. DEP’T. OF CORR., PAROLE IN COLORADO,
https://web.archive.org/web/20130529204156/http://www.state.co.us/gov_dir/correct.html (“common conditions of parole
are that an offender must maintain a certain residence, and attend certain treatment programs. If an offender violates
condition of parole, the supervising parole officer may bring the offender in front of the parole board, and the board may
revoke the offender’s parole, sending him/her back to prison”).
274

STATE OF CONN. BD. OF PARDONS AND PAROLES, STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING AND AGREEMENT,
CONDITIONS OF PAROLE, CONDITION at12 (“Gang Affiliation. You will not associate or affiliate with any street gang,
criminal organization or any individual members thereof”). See also STATE OF CONN. BD. OF PARDONS AND PAROLES,
STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING AND AGREEMENT, CONDITIONS OF PAROLE, ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS (“You also must
abide by the following individual conditions”). See also STATE OF CONN., CONN. DEP’T OF CORR., CONNECTICUT BOARD
OF
PARDONS
AND
PAROLES
STANDARD
CONDITIONS
OF
PAROLE,
NUMBER
11,
http://www.ct.gov/doc/lib/doc/pdf/paroleconditions.pdf (listing standard parole restrictions which include, “I will not at
any time have contact or affiliation with any street gangs or with any members thereof.”)
275
DEL. DEP’T OF CORR., BUREAU OF COMMUNITY CUSTODY & SUPERVISION, OFFICE OF PROBATION AND
PAROLE, CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION (Makes no mention of a standard association restriction but lists as Condition 20
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District of Columbia: Convicted Criminals276
Florida: Individuals Actively Engaged in Criminal Activity and Gang Members277
Georgia: Discretionary278
Hawaii: Convicted Criminals279
Idaho: Convicted Criminals280
“The Board of Parole may, at any time, add special conditions to an offender’s release.”) Delaware now terms its postrelease community supervision “probation.” The conditions of supervision are the same for parolees and probationers in
Delaware. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4347(g) (Outlines rules of parole stating, “Every person while on parole
shall remain in the legal custody of the Department but shall be subject to the orders of the Board of Parole.”). See also
STATE OF DEL. BD. OF PAROLE, RULES OF THE DELAWARE BOARD OF PAROLE 20,
http://boardofparole.delaware.gov/rules.shtml [https://perma.cc/4V6H-AAU6]! (“CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION: The
Board of Parole may, at any time, add special conditions to an offender’s release. Generally, special conditions relate to
the offender’s offense pattern and the possibility of further serious law violations. The offender, through the supervising
officer, may present his/her views to the Board with respect to these special conditions. Likewise, the offender, through the
supervising officer, or the supervising officer may request that special conditions be amended”).
276
Parole: General Conditions of Release, COURT SERVICES AND OFFENDER SUPERVISION AGENCY FOR
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (2014) (on file with the author); (“You shall not associate with persons who have a criminal
record without the permission of your Supervision Officer.”).
THE

277
FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 23-23.010(5)(a)(5) (2017) (“The standard conditions of conditional release shall
be the following . . . [y]ou shall not knowingly associate with any person(s) who is engaging in any criminal activity, a
criminal gang member, or person(s) associated with criminal gang members.”); see also id. r. 23-21.0165(1)(e) (“The
following are the Standard Conditions of Parole . . . Condition 5 -- I shall not knowingly associate with any person(s) who
is engaging in any criminal activity, a criminal gang member, or person(s) associated with criminal gang members.”); see
also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.18 (West 2008) (“The commission shall determine the terms upon which such person shall be
granted parole . . . If the person’s conviction was for a crime that was found to have been committed for the purpose of
benefiting, promoting, or furthering the interests of a criminal gang, one of the conditions must be that the person be
prohibited from knowingly associating with other criminal gang members or associates, except as authorized by law
enforcement officials, prosecutorial authorities, or the court, for the purpose of aiding in the investigation of criminal
activity.”); see also id. § 947.20 (effective July 1, 1997) (“The commission shall adopt general rules on the terms and
conditions of parole and what shall constitute the violation thereof and may make special rules to govern particular cases.
Such rules, both general and special, may include . . . that the parolee shall not associate with persons engaged in criminal
activity.”).
278

State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, Parole Conditions GEORGIA.GOV, https://pap.georgia.gov/paroleconditions [https://perma.cc/3EWP-K26T] (making no mention of an association restriction in standard parole conditions
but states, “the Board may impose special conditions appropriate to the individual’s case, such as drug or alcohol
treatment, mental health counseling, prohibitions on travel or associations, bans on driving, or compliance with electronic
monitoring procedures.”).
279
HAW. PAROLING AUTH., THE PAROLE HANDBOOK 19 (1991) (“You [a parolee] shall not, without prior
approval of your parole officer, associate or be in the company of any person convicted of a criminal act, including anyone
under the active supervision of the Hawaii Paroling Authority.”).
280

IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 50.01.01.250.04(a)-(b) (2018) (making no mention of a standard association
restriction, but authorizing the imposition of special conditions.). See also E-mail from Admin. Assistant, Idaho Comm’n
of Pardons and Parole, to author (on file with author) (stating, “As I explained to you on the telephone, among the special
conditions of parole, we may list the following: The parolee will not associate with known felons (unless specifically
allowed by the Commission or supervising personnel); persons involved with illegal activity, or other person as identified
by supervising personnel. Additionally, if they have known gang affiliations, the Commission may choose to impose a
condition such as: While on parole, have no gang affiliations.”). See also id. (claiming that in their tenure with the Idaho
Commission of Pardons and Parole, they have never seen a release agreement without an association condition prohibiting
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Illinois: Other Supervisees281
Indiana: Inmates and Discretionary282
Iowa: Convicted Criminals283
Kansas: People Engaged in Criminal Activity, Inmates, and Discretionary284
Kentucky: Convicted Felons285
contact with felons and persons involved with illegal activity despite such conditions being labeled special.). See also
IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 50.01.01.250.03(a)-.04(b) (2018), (making no mention of an association restriction in general
conditions of parole but stating, “In addition to general rules of parole, the Commission may add special conditions
appropriate to the individual case . . . [t]he Commission delegates the authority to the executive director to add special
conditions, before an offender has been released to parole or while on parole, after the offender has signed a statement
acknowledging the special conditions.”).
281

730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-3-7 (a)(13) (2018) (“The conditions of every parole and mandatory supervised
release are that the subject . . . not knowingly associate with other persons on parole or mandatory supervised release
without prior written permission of his or her parole agent . . . and not associate with persons who are members of an
organized gang as that term is defined in the Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act.”). See also ILL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 1610.80 (2018) (“Persons released under any form of supervision, mandatory release, mandatory
supervised release, statutory parole or parole, are subject to rules of conduct prescribed by the Board and any special
conditions deemed appropriate by the Board in individual cases.”).
282
IND. DEP’T OF CORR., CONDITIONAL PAROLE RELEASE AGREEMENT (2017),
https://forms.in.gov/download.aspx?id!11273 (“Visiting jails, city lock-ups, or state or federal correctional facilities is
permitted only after first obtaining written permission of the parolee’s supervising officer and of the chief administrative
officer of the jail, city lock-up, or state or federal correctional facility to be visited. Such visits shall be limited to visiting
those who are blood relatives or spouses, unless the supervising officer determines otherwise on a showing by me of a
compelling reason.”) See also 220 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1.1-3-6 (2018) (“Visiting jails, city lock-ups, or state or federal
correctional facilities is permitted only after first obtaining written permission of the parolee’s supervising officer and of
the chief administrative officer of the jail, city lock-up, or state or federal correctional facility to be visited. Such visits
shall be limited to visting [sic] those who are blood relatives or spouses, unless the supervising officer determines
otherwise on a showing by the parolee of a compelling reason.”); id. 1.1-2-4 (“[T]he board may attach special conditions
to the standard parole release agreement, compliance with which shall be a condition to remaining on parole. Such
conditions shall be made a part of all allied records of each offender involved and shall be entered on the parole release
agreement.”).
283
Telephone Interview with Iowa Parole Officers (on file with author) (refusing to provide their names or
forward a copy of the standard parole restrictions provided to a parolee while stating that the standard parole agreement
states, “I shall not associate with any person known to have a criminal record or known to be engaged in criminal
activity.”). See also IOWA ADMIN. CODE, r. 205-10.3(906) (2018) (“A parole or work release agreement containing
standard and special conditions of parole or work release shall be prepared without unreasonable delay following the
board’s issuance of the order for parole or work release. The board may change these standard conditions from time to
time. Special conditions of parole may be imposed at any time in accordance with the needs of the parolee as determined
by the board, the department of corrections, or the district department.”).
284

KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3717(m)-(v) (2018) (Making no mention of an association restriction as part of
the standard parole conditions.). See also KAN. DEP’T OF CORR., DIV. OF CMTY. AND FIELD SERVICES, SUPERVISION
HANDBOOK 8 (2008) (“I will: [n]ot associate with persons actively engaged in illegal activity” and “[o]btain written
permission from the parole officer and institutional administrator to visit or correspond with inmates of any correctional
institution . . . You are not allowed to associate with anyone participating in illegal activity. You are responsible for
knowing and keeping yourself away from these types of situations. You must obtain written permission from your parole
officer and Warden/Director of any county jail, state, federal or private correctional institution before visiting or writing to
any inmate of these institutions.”); id. at 12 (“Special conditions can be imposed by the courts, the parole board, or by your
parole officer. From time to time, special conditions are also imposed based upon your case needs.”).
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Louisiana: Convicted Felons286
Maine: Discretionary287
Maryland: Discretionary288
Massachusetts: Convicted Criminals289
Michigan: Convicted Felons290
285

KY. PAROLE BD., POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, (2015) (“The parolee shall . . . [n]ot associate with a
convicted felon except for a legitimate purpose, including family, residential, occupational, or treatment . . . [n]ot visit with
an inmate of a penal institution without permission of his Parole Officer.”).
286
La. Dep’t of Corr., Supervision Conditions, LOUISIANA.GOV, http://doc.louisiana.gov/supervisionconditions [https://perma.cc/C7GB-J6MK] (“I will not engage in any criminal activity, nor will I associate with people
who are known to be involved in criminal activity. I will avoid bars and casinos. I will refrain from the illegal use of drugs
or alcohol.”).
287
Me.
Dep’t
of
Corr.,
Adult
Community
Corrections,
MAINE.GOV,
https://www.maine.gov/corrections/adult/index.htm [https://perma.cc/H827-JVTN], (making no mention of a standard
association restriction, but stating, “Probation is a court-ordered term of community supervision with specified conditions
for a determinant period of time that cannot exceed the maximum sentence for the offense. It is imposed on an adjudicated
offender who is placed under supervision in lieu of or subsequent to incarceration, with a requirement to comply with
certain standards of conduct. The probationer is required to abide by all conditions ordered by the court.”).
288

MD. CODE REGS. 12.08.01.21(D)-(E) (2018) (containing no mention of a standard association
restriction, but stating, “In addition to the general conditions, the Commission, in its discretion, may impose such special
conditions as it deems appropriate to the individual.”). See also MD. PAROLE COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2007 ANNUAL
REPORT 16 (2007) (containing no mention of a standard or special association condition, but stating, “Report as directed
and follow your Parole Agent’s instructions.”).
289
MASS. PAROLE BD., 2009 ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 10 (2009) (“Parole officers are responsible for
assuring that parolees remain in compliance with the conditions of parole and with any special conditions imposed by the
Parole Board. These conditions are designed to structure the parolee’s return to the community and to assure the protection
of the public. Conditions of parole include maintaining employment and avoiding contact with people known to have
criminal records.”). 120 MASS. CODE REGS. 359.01(IV) (2006) (“I will not associate with persons I know to have a
criminal record, or who are known to be engaged in a violation of law. This prohibition does not apply where such
association is INCIDENTAL to my place of residence or employment, or connected with activities of a bonafide political
or social organization. However, the parole board retains authority to impose limits to these latter activities as a special
condition of parole where such association is inconsistent with my approved parole plan.”).
290
Mich. Dep’t of Corr., Parole Supervision, STATE OF MICH., http://www.michigan.gov/corrections/
0,4551,7-119-1435_1474---,00.html [https://perma.cc/KK3C-8PM6] (“Parolees must meet certain conditions to maintain
their parole status. There are general conditions of parole which require the parolee to report regularly to the parole agent,
prohibit travel out of state without the agent’s permission, require the parolee to maintain employment, to obey the law, to
submit to drug and alcohol testing at the agent’s request, and to reside at an approved residence. The parolee must also
avoid any unauthorized association with known criminals and cannot possess firearms.”). See also “Standard Parole
Condition for Association,” which states “You must not have verbal, written, electronic, or physical contact with anyone
you know to have a felony record without permission of the field agent. You must not have verbal, written, electronic, or
physical contact with anyone you know to be engaged in any behavior that constitutes a violation of any criminal law of
any unit of government” (email on file with author). See also MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 791.7730(4)-(5) (making no mention
of a standard association restriction, but stating, “A paroled prisoner shall comply with the conditions of parole contained
in the parole order and with all subsequent conditions approved by the chairperson of the parole board. A subsequent
condition of parole imposed by a parole agent is valid immediately subject to approval by the chairperson of the parole
board within 60 days of notice to the paroled prisoner of the condition. . . . Except where the parole term is set by statute,
the period of time set by the parole order during which a prisoner remains on parole may be altered by the chairperson of
the parole board, upon a recommendation of the parole agent, for good cause.”).
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Minnesota: Discretionary291
Mississippi: Convicted Felons292
Missouri: Convicted Criminals293
Montana: Other Supervisees294
Nebraska: Convicted Criminals295
Nevada: Convicted Criminals296
New Hampshire: Convicted Felons297
New Jersey: Discretionary298
291

MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., REVIEW OF GUIDELINES FOR REVOCATION OF PAROLE AND SUPERVISED
RELEASE 30 (2009) (making no mention of a standard association condition, but stating, “The offender will at all times
follow the instructions of the agent/designee.”). See also MINN. R. 2940.2000 (2004) (making no mention of a standard
association restrictions). Yet, Minnesota Administrative Rules allow the imposition of Special Conditions of Release
notably listing an association condition as 1 of 3 statutorily permissible Special Conditions. See MINN. R. 2940.2100(A)
(2004) (“Special conditions of release mean any conditions on the release form other than the standard conditions, setting
forth individual specified requirements to be followed by a releasee. These special conditions include . . . special
conditions which set forth limits regarding contact with specified persons, travel from or to specified locations or areas, or
increased contact with the supervising agent beyond that which is considered standard.”).
292

29-201 MISS. ADMIN. CODE R. § 2.5(G) ( 2013) (“I will not knowingly associate with any former inmate
of a penal institution, any person who has been convicted of a felony, or any person of bad reputation.”).
293

MO. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 80-3.010(5) (1983) (amended 2011) (“‘Association: I will not associate with
any person who has been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor.’ As a probationer or parolee reviews his/her past life and
thinks about how s/he got involved in difficulty with the law, many times the probationer or parolee will have to admit that
his/her association with some other person who previously had been in difficulty, played a role in his/her situation. This
condition is to help probationers and parolees avoid this mistake in the future.” See MO. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 80-3.010(5)
(2011) (“I will obtain advance permission from my probation and parole officer before I associate with any person
convicted of a felony or misdemeanor, or with anyone currently under the supervision of the Board of Probation and
Parole. It is my responsibility to know with whom I am associating.”).
294
STATE OF MONT., DEP,T OF CORR., CONDITIONS OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 1 (2010) (allowing the
Board of Pardons and Parole or the Sentencing Court to apply the following condition: “Association: I will not associate
with probationers, parolees, prison inmates, or persons in the custody of any law enforcement agency without prior
approval from a Probation/Parole Officer.”). See also MONT. ADMIN. R. 20.25.702(3) (2012) (making no mention of a
standard association restriction, but stating, “A hearing panel may order additional special conditions. Additionally, a
hearing panel shall consider Department of Corrections’ requests for special conditions. Any special conditions imposed
by the department must be approved by a hearing panel. Special conditions must not be unrealistic or vague and must be
reasonably related to the offender’s crime, public safety, or the circumstances and rehabilitation of the offender.”).
295

NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,116(g) (1995) (“Refrain from associating with persons known to him or her to
be engaged in criminal activities or, without permission of his or her district parole officer, with persons known to him or
her to have been convicted of a crime.”).
296
STATE OF NEV., DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND PUB. SAFETY, PAROLE AGREEMENT 1 (1999)
(“Associates: You shall not associate with individuals who have criminal records or other individuals as deemed
inappropriate by the Division. You shall not have any contact with persons confined in a correctional institution unless
specific written permission has been granted by your supervising officer and the correctional institution.”).
297
N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. PAR 401.02(b)(10) (2017) (“The following conditions shall be imposed for all
parolees . . . [n]ot associating with criminal companions or such other individuals as shall be ordered by the court or parole
board.”). See also N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. PAR 102.02 (2017) (“‘Criminal companion’ means any person with whom a
parolee is associating, who has been convicted of a felony crime in the state of New Hampshire or any crime in any other
jurisdiction which would have been a felony if it had been committed in New Hampshire.”).
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New Mexico: Other Supervisees299
New York: Convicted Criminals300
North Carolina: Convicted Criminals301
North Dakota: People Engaged in Criminal Activity, Convicted Felons, and Other
Supervisees302
Ohio: Discretionary303
Oklahoma: Convicted Criminals304
Oregon: Discretionary305
298

N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:71–6.4(h) (making no mention of a standard association restriction, but
stating, “Nothing in this section shall prohibit the Board members from imposing as a specific condition of parole that the
parolee notify an employer or intended employer of his or her parole status and criminal record where good cause exists to
impose such a specific condition.”); see also N.J. STATE PAROLE BD., THE PAROLE BOOK 18-19 (5TH ed. 2012) (making
no mention of a standard parole association condition, but stating, “The Board panel can change your conditions at any
time for good reason. The Board also has given the power to the District Parole Supervisors, Assistant District Parole
Supervisors and designated representatives of the District Parole Supervisors to impose and discharge special conditions of
parole.”).
299
N.M. Corr. Dep’t, Probation and Parole Division, N.M. CORRECTIONS DEP’T,
http://cd.nm.gov/ppd/ppd.html [https://perma.cc/8TYP-LQ6G] (making no mention of a standard association restriction,
but stating, “Association: I will not associate with any person identified by my Probation/Parole Officer as being
detrimental to my Probation supervision, which may include persons having a criminal record, other probationers and
parolees, and victims or witnesses of my crime or crimes.”).
300

Dep’t of Corr. and Cmty. Supervision, New York State Parole Handbook, OFFICIAL WEBSITE N.Y.
STATE, http://www.doccs.ny.gov/ Parole_Handbook.html#top [https://perma.cc/KKG8-P54M] (“I will not be in the
company of, or fraternize with any person I know to have a criminal record or whom I know to have been adjudicated a
Youthful Offender, except for accidental encounters in public places, work, school, or in any other instance with the
permission of my Parole Officer.”).
301

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1368.4(e)(1) (2017) (“[N]ot knowingly associate with any known or previously
convicted users, possessors, or sellers of any such illegal drugs or controlled substances. . . .”).
302
N.D. PAROLE BD., CONDITIONS OF PAROLE 1 (2010) (“I will not associate with individuals who use
illegal controlled substances, engage in illegal activities, and are known felons. Any association with a known felon or
someone under parole/probation supervision must be approved, in writing, by Parole and Probation Services Program
Manager.”). See also N.D. DEP’T OF CORR. AND REHAB., INMATE HANDBOOK 64 (2013) (making no mention of a standard
association restriction, but noting, “DOCR staff will transcribe the order of the Parole Board and the conditions of parole
established by the Parole Board.”).
303

OHIO DEP’T OF REHAB. AND CORR., CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION 1 (2013) (“I agree to . . . any other
special conditions imposed by the Parole Board, Court, or Interstate Compact.”). See also OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5120:1-112(B)(3) (2018) (making no mention of a standard parole association condition, but stating, “The releasee shall comply
with all lawful orders given to the releaseee by the department of rehabilitation and correction, its authorized agencies, or
its representatives, which shall include any sanctions that may be imposed in response to violent behavior at any time
during supervision.”).
304

PARDON AND PAROLE BOARD, POLICY AND PROCEDURES MANUAL 25 (2007) (“Unless the parole
officer gives prior permission because of work or for other good reason, parolee may not associate with persons on parole
or probation or persons with criminal convictions, or communicate with inmates of any penal institution, except for
members of parolee’s immediate family.”).
305

OR. REV.STAT. § 144.102(2)(a) (2018) (“The board or the supervisory authority shall determine, and
may at any time modify, the conditions of post-prison supervision, which may include, among other conditions, that the
person shall: . . . [c]omply with the conditions of post-prison supervision as specified by the board or supervisory

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol22/iss1/3

2019]

DIVIDED WE FALL

67

Pennsylvania: Discretionary306
Rhode Island: Other Supervisees307
South Carolina: Convicted Criminals308
South Dakota: Convicted Criminals309
Tennessee: Discretionary310
Texas: Individuals Actively Engaged in Criminal Activity311
authority.”); OR.REV.STAT. § 144.270(2)(a)–(b) (2018) (“(2) The board shall determine, and may at any time modify, the
conditions of parole, which may include, among other conditions, that the person paroled must: (a) Accept the parole
granted subject to all terms and conditions specified by the board[, and] (b) Be under the supervision of the Department of
Corrections and its representatives and abide by their direction and counsel.”). See also STATE OF OREGON BOARD OF
PAROLE AND POST-PRISON SUPERVISION, ORDER OF SUPERVISION CONDITIONS, GENERAL SUPERVISION CONDITIONS,
https://www.oregon.gov/BOPPPS/docs/order_of_supervision_sample.pdf (Making no mention of a standard association
condition, but stating as Condition 13 “Report as required and abide by the direction of supervising officer.” The Order of
Supervision Conditions also provides for special conditions stating “Special conditions will be noted in numerical order
following this paragraph. The special conditions may be several pages in length. The Board’s authority to impose special
conditions of supervision if the person is required to report as a sex offender is found in OR.REV.STAT. § 144.102(3)(a) for
post-prison supervision cases and OR. REV. STAT. § 144.270(3)(a) for parole cases.”). See id., (Making no mention of a
general association condition, but stating “Parole/Post-Prison Supervision is subject to all listed General Conditions and
the designated Special Conditions.” Listing as Special Condition 11 “Offender shall have no contact direct or indirect with
those listed below”).
306
PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, PAROLE HANDBOOK: YOUR GUIDE TO SUCCESS IN
PRISON AND IN THE COMMUNITY, GENERAL CONDITIONS OF PAROLE, 27 (2011), http://www.pbpp.pa.gov/
Information/Documents/Publications/Final%20Parole%20Handbook%20NOVEMBER%202016.pdf (Making no mention
of a standard association condition, but noting “Must maintain regular contact with the parole agent by . . . [r]eporting
regularly as instructed and following written instructions of agent.”). See also id. at 14 (“What are special conditions of
parole? . . . [s]pecial conditions of parole are the rules you need to live by the entire time you are under parole supervision.
These rules are not the same for every parolee. They are tailored specifically to you and your risks.”).
307
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, PROBATION AND PAROLE FAQ, WHAT ARE
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION AND PAROLE SUPERVISION?, http://www.doc.ri.gov/probation/faq.php
[https://perma.cc/YN9A-826H] (“Parolees cannot socialize with other parolees unless special permission is granted by the
Parole Board.”).
THE

308
S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-430(2)(3) (2010) (“The probationer shall: . . . avoid persons or places of
disreputable or harmful character”). See also POLICY AND PROCEDURE: SOUTH CAROLINA BOARD OF PAROLES AND
PARDONS,
34
(2015)
https://www.dppps.sc.gov/content/download/68278/1576111/file/Parole#Board#Manual#April#2015.pdf (“I shall not associate with any person who has a criminal record, or any other person whom my Agent
has instructed me to avoid.”) .
309

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 24-15A-24 (“The board and the department may place reasonable restrictions
upon a parolee which are designed to continue the parolee’s rehabilitation, including limited areas of residence or
community access. . . .”). SOUTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES,
COMMUNITY SUPERVISION AGREEMENT, CONDITION 7 (“I will avoid those companions with criminal influences and keep
the hours specified by my parole agent.”) (on file with author).
310
STATE OF TENNESSEE BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, DIVISION OF BOARD OPERATIONS, PAROLE
CERTIFICATE (Making no mention of a standard association restriction but states at Condition (7) “I will allow my
Probation/Parole Officer to visit my home, employment site, or elsewhere, and will carry out all lawful instructions he/she
gives and report to my Probation/Parole Officer as instructed, and will carry out all lawful instructions of the
Administrative Case Review Committee. . . .”) (on file with author).
311

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE – PAROLE DIVISION, CERTIFICATE OF PAROLE, GENERAL
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Utah: Convicted Felons312
Vermont: Discretionary313
Virginia: Discretionary314
Washington: Discretionary315
West Virginia: Discretionary316
CONDITIONS OF PAROLE RELEASE, CONDITION 6 (“I shall avoid persons or places of disreputable character.”). See also
TEXAS CODE OF CRIM. PROC. ART. 42.12 § 11(a)(3) (“Conditions of community supervision may include, but shall not be
limited to, the conditions that the defendant shall . . . [a]void persons or places of disreputable or harmful character,
including any person, other than a family member of the defendant, who is an active member of a criminal street gang .”)
(on file with author). TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES/TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE PAROLE
DIVISION, PAROLE IN TEXAS: ANSWERS TO COMMON QUESTIONS 55 (2008), http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/bpp/publications/
PIT_2017_Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/QR27-JTFN] (“Rules of release may include, but are not limited, to the following . . .
[a]void persons or places of disreputable or harmful character.”).
312
STATE OF UTAH BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, INFORMATION FOR VICTIMS, APPENDIX B –
PAROLE AGREEMENT, CONDITION 8, https://bop.utah.gov/images/pdf/victims.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2M8-LW55]
(“Association: I will not knowingly associate with any person who is involved in criminal activity or who has been
convicted of a felony, without approval from my parole agent.”).
313
VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AGENCY OF HUMAN SERVICES, PAROLE BOARD MANUAL,
23 (2017), http://www.doc.state.vt.us/about/parole-board/vermont-parole-board-manual [https://perma.cc/7FY2-JHSL] (
Your Parole Officer may restrict your associates. You shall not associate with any child under the age of 16 without
permission from your Parole Officer . . . You will not associate with any person identified as being detrimental to my
supervision, which may include persons with a criminal record, others on supervision or victims or witnesses of your
crime(s) as designated by your Parole Officer,”).
314

VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, CONDITIONS OF PROBATION/POST RELEASE SUPERVISION
(2005) (Making no mention of a standard association condition, but stating “I will follow my Probation and parole
Officer’s instructions and be truthful, cooperative.”). See also VIRGINIA PAROLE BOARD, POLICY MANUAL, PAROLE CASE
SUPERVISION POLICIES AND PRACTICES, 17, https://vpb.virginia.gov/files/1107/vpb-policy-manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F52J-ZUNH] (“ Special Conditions: The board may also impose special conditions of parole relating to travel, program
participation, specialized treatment, or other conditions as determined by the board, which may be removed by the parole
officer when deemed appropriate, however the board may specify that certain conditions be removed only with prior
approval of the board”).
315
WASH. ADMIN. CODE 381-40-110(1) (Listing the 5 general conditions of parole, but making no mention
of a standard association condition. Yet, stating that authorities may impose additional conditions.). See WASH. ADMIN.
CODE 381-40-110(1)(c) (“Obey all laws and abide by any special conditions imposed by the indeterminate sentence review
board or any written instructions issued by a community corrections officer of the department of corrections.”).
Washington State Department of Corrections Policies explicitly note that Community Corrections Officers have the
authority to impose an association restriction. See also WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS POLICIES,
DOC
390.600
DIRECTIVE
(I)(A)(2)(a),
http://www.doc.wa.gov/information/policies/files/390600.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MTZ9-AG79] (“The Department may impose appropriate conditions during supervision for offenders
that: . . . [a]re on community custody that committed their crime(s) on or after June 6, 1996. Conditions will include but
will not be limited to . . . [p]rohibiting contact with other specified individuals or specific class of individuals”).
316

WEST VIRGINIA DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS, STANDARD CONDITIONS OF PAROLE,
https://dcr.wv.gov/aboutus/parole-services/Pages/conditions-of-parole.aspx [https://perma.cc/448V-NUHT] (last visited
Oct. 2, 2018)(Listing standard conditions but making no mention of a standard association condition but noting that “
[a]dditional special conditions can be placed on offenders at the Parole Officers discretions. These vary from Officer to
Officer.”). See WEST VIRGINIA DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS, STANDARD CONDITIONS OF PAROLE, SPECIAL CONDITIONS
available at: http://www.wvdoc.com/wvdoc/ParoleServicesResources/StandardConditionsof Parole/tabid/143/Default.
aspx.
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Wisconsin: Discretionary317
Wyoming: Convicted Felons318

317

STATE OF WISCONSIN, DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, STANDARD RULES OF SUPERVISION, CONDITION 18,
https://doc.wi.gov/Pages/AboutDOC/CommunityCorrections/SupervisionRules.aspx [https://perma.cc/ACK8-ZE8J] (last
visited Oct. 2, 2018) (Making no mention of an association restriction, but stating as Condition 18 “Comply with any court
ordered conditions and/or any additional rules established by your agent. The additional rules established by your agent
may be modified at any time as appropriate.”). See also WIS. ADMIN. CODE DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES
§ 98.04(3)(a)–(n) (Listing standard conditions, but making no mention of a standard association condition. Yet, Wisconsin
does allow a parole officer to impose special conditions “When supervision begins, an agent shall meet with a client to
review or develop written rules and specific conditions of the client’s supervision, or both.”) (emphasis added).
318
WYOMING BOARD OF PAROLE, GENERAL CONDITIONS, CONDITION 6 (“Not associate with or have
contact with felons or individuals determined to pose a negative influence by a Parole Agent, except as approved by a
Parole Agent.”). Available at: http://static.nicic.gov/Library/010665.pdf.
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